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Abstract 
We propose two linkable ring signature schemes for privacy-preserving appli-
cations. They are short linkable ring signature scheme and separable linkable 
threshold ring signature scheme. The short linkable ring signature scheme is 
the first linkable ring signature scheme that produces signatures of size inde-
pendent of group size. This makes the scheme scalable and very practical to 
be deployed in a large scale. The separable linkable threshold ring signature 
scheme is the first of its kind to support separability and efficient threshold-
ing. Separability allows users of a scheme to be heterogenous from security 
parameters to cryptographic primitives and therefore is a favorable property 
in ad hoc networks. 
We discuss and rigorously define notions of security and functionality that 
have never been considered in the literature, such as accusatory linking and 
non-slanderability. Accusatory linking identifies a cheating signer and hence 
discourages cheating. Accusatorily linkable ring signatures therefore find new 
applications. Non-slanderability ensures honest users cannot be slandered on. 
It is a vital property that should be possessed by all linkable ring signature 
schemes. We formulate a security model for linkable (threshold) ring signa-
ture schemes and prove the security of our two proposed constructions under 
ii “ 
the model, under some well-known mathematical assumptions and the Link 
Decisional RSA (LD-RSA) Assumption we formulate. 
We investigate three challenging privacy-preserving applications. They are 
offline anonymous electronic cash, electronic voting and anonymous attesta-
tion. They all face a thorny and contradicting difficulty — on one hand users 
want their privacy to be maintained, on the other the authority wants authen-
tication for eligibility. We show how to use our proposed schemes to implement 
all the three of them. 
• • • « 
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摘要 
我們提出兩個可用於隱私維護應用鏈結性環簽名（Linkable Ring Signature)方 
案。它們是短鏈結性環簽名（Short Linkable Ring Signature)方案和可分離鏈結性門 




礎（cryptographic primitives) ’是個於在無基礎架構網路（Ad Hoc Networks)有利 
的特點。 
我們討論並精確地定義文獻上未被提及的安全和功能槪念，例如具指控性的鏈結 






Anonymous Electronic Cash)，電子投票（Electronic Voting)禾口匿名證名 
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In this chapter, we first take a close look at the word "privacy". Specifically, 
we discuss what it means from a sociology point of view as well as a scientific 
classification; and its value and importance to different people. We then intro-
duce Cryptography by going through its historical development and studying 
its significance nowadays. Finally we argue that Cryptography is a key to 
realize the attainment of various stringent and often contradicting goals, such 
as preserving the privacy of the users, of computer protocols. 
1.1 Privacy 
How much is privacy worth? Expect different answers when you ask different 
people. To an individual privacy is one of the inherent freedoms of a free 
society. It is the right of people to keep something secret and not known to 
anyone else. In this sense, privacy is just priceless. But privacy does have 
a price sometimes. On one hand, maintaining privacy does not come free of 
charge, people often need to pay an extra cost for hiding a piece of information 
that would otherwise have been known by others. In this case, the price of 
privacy is that extra cost paid or willing to be paid. On the other hand, 
there are people willing to pay in order to unveil secrets others have been 
striving hard to keep — think of how much magazines pay for candid pictures 
1 ‘ 
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of celebrities taken by paparazzi, and think of how desperate companies try 
to collect information about spending behavior of their loyal customers. Yet 
another way to value privacy is to look at the huge amount of money spent 
every year on lawyers to argue the privacy laws. 
History has also shown us that we care very much about our privacy. In 
1361, the Justices of the Peace Act In England provided for the arrest of peep-
ing toms and eavesdroppers. In 1776, the Swedish Parliament enacted the 
Access to Public Records Act that required that all government-held informa-
tion be used for legitimate purposes.The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights specifically protects territorial and communications privacy. Article 12 
states, "No one should be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home-or correspondence, nor to attacks on his honour or reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interferences 
or attacks." In 1995 and 1997, the European Union enacted two directives 
to ensure consistent levels of protection for its citizens.The directives set a 
common baseline level of privacy. The 1995 Data Protection Directive set a 
benchmark for national laws for processing personal information in electronic 
and manual files, and the 1997 Telecommunications Directive established spe-
cific protections covering telephone, digital television, mobile networks, and 
other telecommunications. In addition, the U.S. Constitution and subsequent 
laws have given us a right to be left alone. 
So what is Privacy? Traditional definitions of privacy, which are often 
influenced by the "right of the individual to be let alone" [98], separate a 
person or their actions from a group of persons [44]: 
‘'Privacy in our common sense is strongly connected with 
the idea that there are some things another person should 
not be able to see or knpw.‘‘ 
Privacy may also be defined as the right to determine the amount of personal 
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information which should be available to others [99]: 
‘'Privacy is the claim of individuals, group, or institutions 
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
informatioii about them is communicated to others.‘‘ 
Privacy is both an intrinsic value as well as an instrumental value serving 
other goals (e.g., generation of knowledge, profit). Besides these theoretical 
considerations, privacy also serves pragmatic purposes when it is included in 
the design of software systems, e.g. resulting in higher acceptance by users. 
A more fine-grained description of privacy was given by Flinn and Maurer 
48] who identified six levels of anonymity, ranging from the unequivocal as-
signment of data to a person to the complete disengagement of data from the 
person. The different levels are as follows: 
• Super-identification. The user's identity is authenticated by means based 
on the environment of the user adaptive system. This guarantees that no 
component of the user adaptive system can counterfeit the identity of the 
respective user. The assignment of the data needed for authentication 
to the user or to the components is delegated to an administrative entity 
outside the system architecture. Examples of this kind of identification 
and authentication are the X.509 standard [2 . 
• Identification. The user identifies himself and demonstrates knowledge 
of a secret which is then compared by the system to a stored value. 
The system is responsible for the confirmation of the user's identity. As 
an example, this mechanism is often implemented in current operation 
systems. 
• Latent identification (controlled pseudonyms). The user identifies himself 
to the system and adopts one of the defined pseudonyms. Subsequently, 
he is able to act without revealing his identity to particular components 
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of the system while acting under a pseudonym. The pseudonym can be 
revealed under defined circumstances in order to ascertain the identity 
of the user. For example, this procedure is widely used in box number 
advertisements. 
• Pseudonymous identification (uncontrolled pseudonyms). When using 
the system for the first time, the user decides on a unique pseudonym 
and a secret which he will also use for following sessions. The system is 
unable to ascertain the identity of the user, therefore it is also unable to 
link the pseudonym to the user's identity. This method is used in most 
Web-based services. It is also used in anonymous remailers which allow 
email exchange by means of uncontrolled unique pseudonyms. 
• Anonymous identification. This user gains access to the system by pro-
viding a secret without disclosing his identity. The system is unable to 
distinguish between users which have knowledge about the same secret. 
The users of the same secret constitute an anonymity set. For instance, 
a bank account might be managed as a numbered account where clients 
only have to provide a password to get access. 
• Anonymity. The user neither identifies nor authenticates himself to the 
system. The system is unable to distinguish among the users or to dif-
ferentiate between users. Anonymity is given in most real life situations 
but not in the World-wide Web, where electronic trails on several layers 
make it possible to link the current user and his system interactions with 
additional information to the point of revealing his identity. 
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1.2 Cryptography 
I.2.1 History of Cryptography 
The earliest known use of cryptography is found in non-standard hieroglyphs 
carved into monuments from Egypt's Old Kingdom some 4500 years ago. The 
Romans are famous for the Caesar cipher and its variations. 
The invention of the frequency analysis technique for breaking monoalpha-
betic substitution ciphers was sometime around AD 1000. It was the most fun-
damental cryptanalytic advance until WWII. Essentially all ciphers remained 
vulnerable to this cryptanalytic technique until the invention of the poly alpha-
betic cipher. 
Mathematical methods proliferated in the time leading up to World War 
II, for example, the application of statistical techniques to cryptanalysis and 
cipher development and the break into the German Army's Enigma. 
The mid-1970s there were two major advances. First was the publication 
of the draft Data Encryption Standard [80, 81] in the U.S. Federal Register in 
1975. It was later adopted and published as a FIPS Publication. The second 
development, in 1976, was perhaps even more important, for it fundamentally 
changed the way crypto systems might work. This was the publication of [42: 
by Diffie and Hellman. It introduced a radically new method of distributing 
cryptographic keys, which went far toward solving one of the fundamental 
problems of cryptography, key distribution, and has become known as Diffie-
Hellman key exchange. The article also stimulated the almost immediate pub-
lic development of a new class of enciphering algorithms, the asymmetric key 
algorithms. . 
Chapter 1 Introduction 6 
1.2.2 Cryptography Today 
Cryptography is traditionally the study of means of converting information 
from its comprehensible form into an incomprehensible format, making it un-
readable without secret knowledge. Today, it is a cross-disciplinary science 
involving Complexity Theory, Algebra and even Engineering and many oth-
ers. It serves a core to achieve information security such as confidentiality, au-
thentication, integrity, non-repudiation privacy and etc. Confidentiality keeps 
information secret to all but the authorized. Authentication ascertains the 
origin of a message. Integrity protects a message from unauthorized modifi-
cation. Non-repudiation prevents a sender from denying that he has sent a 
message. Anonymity aims at hiding the identity of a user. 
Our society has entered an era where commerce activities, business trans-
actions and government services have been, and more and more of them will 
be, conducted and offered over open computer and communications networks 
such as the Internet. Doing things online has a great advantage of an always-
on availability to people in any corner of the world. Here are a few examples 
of things that have been, or will be done online: Banking, bill payment, home 
shopping, stock trading, auctions, gambling, fair signing of contracts, time-
stamping, voting, ticket booking, interactive games, digital libraries, 
From e-mail to cellular communications, from secure Web access to digital 
cash, cryptography is an essential part of today's information systems. Cryp-
tography helps provide accountability, fairness, accuracy, and confidentiality. 
It can prevent fraud in electronic commerce and assure the validity of financial 
transactions. It can prove your identity or protect your anonymity. It can 
keep vandals from altering your Web page and prevent industrial competitors 
from reading your confidential documents. And in the future, as commerce 
and communications continue to move to computer networks, cryptography 
will become more and more vital. 
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1.2.3 Cryptography For Privacy 
The rapid advancement of technology witnessed many commercial applications 
launched to provide services in the Internet. The growth of the worldwide 
Internet user base and with Internet based transactions is reaching an ever-
increasing value, it makes sense for the parties involved to secure the Internet. 
Haphazard handling of financial and personal information can lead to the In-
ternet being constantly associated with fraud and privacy abuses instead of 
being a viable commerce medium. 
Security and privacy have long been important issues forming the basis of 
numerous democracies around the world. In the digital age, securing personal 
information and ensuring privacy pose to be issues of paramount concern. 
Many studies have suggested that a majority of consumers are concerned about 
when, what and how their personal information is being collected, how this 
information is being used and whether it is being protected. They want to 
know whether the information is being sold or shared with others, and if so 
with whom and for what purposes. They also want to have control over their 
privacy in today's digital age where strides in telecommunication, storage and 
software technologies have made monitoring a person's activities effortless. 
It is no exaggeration to say that cryptography is the savior of the digital 
world. Cryptography allows people to carry over the confidence found in the 
physical world to the electronic world, thus allowing people to do business 
electronically without worries of deceit and deception. As mentioned in the 
earlier section, cryptography provides the necessary tools such as encryption, 
authentication, anonymity and so forth for protocol developers. When properly 
used, cryptography helps combat various security crimes. 
User privacy is, however, often sacrificed for other security concerns. In 
most situations, user privacy is never a prime concern of protocol developers 
such as large corporations or the government. Sometimes companies even do 
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the other way round - they try every possible means to know other customers 
better. While technology for confidentiality, non-repudiation and etc have been 
promisingly achieved by cryptography, technology for anonymity has been left 
behind (possibly due to its hardness in nature, or less attention was paid among 
the research community, which could be more likely). 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
In this chapter, we have discussed what privacy is, its value and its importance 
to different people. We have also introduced Cryptography by going through 
its historical development and studying its significance nowadays. Finally we 
have argued that Cryptography is a key to realize the attainment of various 
stringent and always contradicting goals, such as preserving the privacy of the 
users, of computer protocols. 
Chapter 2 provides the necessary background and foundations of Cryptog-
raphy that will be used in the subsequent chapters. We first give an intro-
duction to the topics of complexity theories, algebra, number theory. We then 
proceed to review various cryptographic primitives including encryption, digi-
tal signatures, etc. Finally we elaborate on zero-knowledge proof of knowledge 
protocols. 
In Chapter 3, we survey the literature on works related to our thesis. They 
serve as a good tutorial on various security goals and notions, current state-of-
art technology and similarities and differences among schemes. We hope that 
after reading this chapter, the readers can better understand the incentives that 
have driven the writing of this thesis, and at the same time better evaluate 
the contribution of this thesis. 
In Chapter 4, we investigate in depth one extension of ring signatures, 
namely the linkable ring signatures'. We first give an introduction of linkable 
ring signatures and the significance of linkability in ring signatures. Then we 
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introduce notions novel to linkable ring signatures, together with discussion on 
their importance and impact. Finally we give a fully developed security model 
that captures the security requirements of linkable ring signature schemes un-
der various possible adversarial attacks. 
In Chapter 5, we propose the first short linkable ring signature scheme 
construction. By short we mean the signature size is independent of the size 
of the member group a signature is signed on behalf of. Being short enables 
linkable ring signatures to be scalable and deployed in large-scale scenarios We 
propose a new mathematical assumption and then reduce the security of our 
construction to it plus several well-known mathematical assumptions. 
In Chapter 6, we propose the first separable linkable threshold ring signa-
ture scheme. Separability is the key for a scheme to be practically deployed in 
ad hoc environment in which machines are highly heterogenous. Our proposed 
scheme also supports thresholding efficiently in the sense of computational and 
storage/communication complexities. We reduce the security of our scheme to 
well-known mathematical assumptions. 
Chapter 7 discusses real-life examples when Cryptography is applied to 
achieve the stringent and sometimes contradictory requirements of various ap-
plications. The three applications we are going to look at are: Offline Anony-
mous Electronic Cash, E- Voting and Anonymous Attestation. 
In Chapter 8, we conclude the thesis. 
In Appendix A, we list the papers derived from this thesis. 
Chapter 2 
Background 
Our goal in this chapter is to provide the necessary background and founda-
tions of cryptography that will be used in the subsequent chapters. We first 
give an introduction to the topics of complexity theories, algebra, number the-
ory. We then proceed to review various cryptographic primitives including 
encryption, digital signatures, etc. Finally we elaborate on zero-knowledge 
proof of knowledge protocols. 
2.1 Notations 
In this thesis, we denote by N the set of positive integers, by Z the set of 
integers, and by M the set of real numbers. We denote by [a, b] the integers x 
satisfying a < a; < 6, by L^：^」the largest integer less than or equal to cc, and 
by�rrl the smallest integer greater than or equal to x. |s| means the number 
of elements in s if s is a finite set, or the length of s if s is a string, or the 
bit-length/size of s if s is an integer. represents the string of k ones. When 
we write x ^R X, we mean x is chosen from the finite set X uniformly at 
random. If 5 is a set, p(5) denotes the power set of S (i.e. the set of all 
the subsets of S) while pd{S) denotes the set of all the subsets of S with d 
elements. 
10 
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2.2 Complexity Theory 
2.2.1 Order Notation 
The following is useful when describing the asymptotic behaviors of functions. 
Definition 1 (Order Notation.) f{n) = 0{g{n)) if there exists a positive 
constant c and a positive integer TIQ such that 0 < /(O) < cg{n) for all n> UQ. 
f{n) = Q(g(n)) if there exists a positive constant c and a positive integer 
UQ such that 0 < cg{n) < f{n) for all n > UQ. f{n) = Q{g{n)) if there exists 
positive constant Ci and C2, and a positive integer UQ such that Cig{n) < f{n) < 
C2g{n) for all n > UQ. f{n) = o{g(n)) if for any positive constant c > 0 there 
exists a constant UQ > 0 such that 0 < f{n) < cg(n) for all n> UQ. 
Definition 2 (Negligibility.) A negligible function, denoted by "(A)，is a 
function /(入)such that for all polynomials p{X), "(A) < l/p(/\) holds for all 
sufficiently large A. A function is non-negligible if it is not negligible. 
Sometimes we say a probability is overwhelming to mean that it is negligibly 
less than 1. 
2.2.2 Algorithms and Protocols 
We model algorithms using Turing machines. A deterministic Turing ma-
chine is a finite state machine having an infinite read-write tape and the state 
transitions are completely determined by the input. In a probabilistic Turing 
machine, the state transitions are determined by the input and the output of 
coin tosses. • 
Definition 3 (Algorithm.) An deterministic (resp. probabilistic) algorithm 
is a deterministic (resp. prohabilisti'c) Turing machine. 
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Often the coin tosses in a probabilistic algorithm are considered as internal 
coin tosses. A second way to look at a probabilistic algorithm is to consider 
the output of the coin tosses as an additional input, which is supplied by an 
external coin-tossing device. 
Given x, the output A{x) of a probabilistic algorithm A is a random variable 
induced by the coin tosses. Let A{x) = y denote the event "A outputs y on 
input rr". By FY[A{X) = y], we mean the probability of this event. 
By A(-) we denote that the algorithm A has one input. By ...,•) we 
denote that A has several inputs, y A{x) denotes that y is obtained by 
running algorithm A on input x. In case A is deterministic, then this y is 
unique. If A is probabilistic (in which case we sometimes write y A{x))^ 
then y is a random variable. If 5 is a set, then y ^ S {or sometimes y ^ S) 
denotes that y was chosen form S uniformly at random. 
Let 6 be a boolean function. The notation {{yi Ai{xi)}i^[i^n]\\b{yn)) 
denotes the event that h{yn) is true after the sequential execution of Ai on 
input cci, i G [1, n . 
Definition 4 (Efficient Algorithm.) An efficient algorithm or a polynomial-
time algorithm is an algorithm whose worst-case running time function is of 
the form where n is the input size and k is a constant. 
We use the shorthand notation "PPT" for "probabilistic polynomial-time" 
when describing an algorithm. 
Next, we define what a two-party protocol is. 
Definition 5 (Two-Party Protocol.) A two-party protocol is a pair of in-
teractive probabilistic Turing machines {V, V). An execution (or run) of the 
protocol {V, V) on input x (for V) and y (for V) is an alternating sequence of 
V-rounds and V-rounds, each producing a message to be delivered to the other 
party (except for the last V-round). The sequence of such message is called the 
transcript of this run of the protocol 
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If, for all X and y, the length of such sequence, as well as the expected 
running time of V and V，are polynomial in the length of x and y, then 
(P, V) is an efficient two-party protocol. By '\V{x) ^ we denote the 
probability space that assigns to a sequence of strings tt the probability that 
a run of the {V, V) protocol, on input x and y, will produce tt as transcript. 
2.2.3 Relations and Languages 
Computational problems are often modeled as decision problems: decide whether 
a given x e {0,1}* belongs to a language L C {0,1}*. First we recall the 
polynomial-time reduction among decision problems which is useful to com-
pare their relative "hardness". 
Definition 6 (Polynomial-time Reduction.) Let Li and L2 be two deci-
sion problems. Li is said to poly time reduce to L2, written Li <p L2, if there 
is an algorithm that solves Li which uses, as a subroutine, an algorithm for 
solving L2, and which runs in polynomial time if the algorithm for L2 does. 
Let R C {0’ 1}* X {0’ 1}* be a binary relation. We say that R is polynomially 
bounded if there exists a polynomial Q such that < (3(|x|) holds for all 
(x, w；) in R. Furthermore, R is an NP-relation if it is polynomially bounded 
and if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding membership pairs 
(x, w) in R. Let LR = {a;|3if； such that (x, w) G R} be the language defined by 
R. A language L is in NP if there exists an NP-relation RL C {0,1}* x {•, 1}* 
such that X G 1/ if and only if there exists a w such that (x, w) G RL. Such a 
w is called a witness of the membership of x in L. The set of all witnesses of 
X is denoted by RLIx). 
Definition 7 (The Classes P, NP and NPC.) The complexity class P is 
the set of all decision problems that 'are solvable in polynomial time. The com-
plexity class NP is the set of all decision problems for which a yes answer can 
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be verified in polynomial time given some extra information, called a certificate. 
A decision problem L is said to be NP-complete if L ^ NP and Li <p L for 
every Li G NP. The class of all NF-complete problems is denoted by NPC. 
2.3 Algebra and Number Theory 
Algebra and Number Theory are the mathematical foundation of Modern 
Cryptography. Numerous cryptographic algorithms are designed around re-
sults from them. They are also the cornerstone of (provable) security of cryp-
tographic schemes. 
We use the following notations. A prime number p is called a safe prime 
ii p = 2p' + 1, such that p' is also a prime number. In this case, p' is known 
as a Sophie Germain prime. An integer n is called an RSA modulus if n is 
a product of two primes of equal size. An integer n is called a safe-prime 
product, if n is a product of two safe primes of equal size. 
2.3.1 Groups 
First recall the definition of a group (a cyclic group in particular) and some 
other related notions. 
Definition 8 (Group.) A group is a set G together with an associative binary 
operation * on elements of G such that G contains an identity element for * 
and every element has an inverse under *. If * is commutative, the group is 
called abelian or commutative. Often, a group is denoted by (G, *) or simply 
by G. A group G is called finite if \G\ is finite. The number of elements of a 
finite group is called its order. 
Definition 9 (Cyclic Group.) A group G is cyclic if there is g e G such 
that every element a ^ G can be written in the form of g^ for some /c G Z. 
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That is G = > 0}. We call such g a generator of G and write (g) = G 
to indicate that g generates G. 
Definition 10 (Group Order.) Let G be a group and a e G. The order 
of a, denoted by ord(a)， is the smallest positive integer n such that a" = 1， 
provided that such an integer exists. If such an n does not exist, then the order 
of a is defined to be oo. 
Definition 11 (Subgroup.) Let (G, *) be a group. We say that (i/, *) is a 
subgroup of G if H C G and {H, *) is a group. 
The set of the integers modulo an integer n, denoted as Z^, together with 
addition modulo n constitutes an abelian group of order m. Another important 
group is Z*, formed by the positive integers smaller than n and relatively prime 
to n together with the multiplication modulo n. Finally denote by QR{n) the 
cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo n with multiplication modulo n as 
the group operation. 
The following definition is useful when we talk about group orders. 
Definition 12 (Euler function.) Let n he a positive integer. The Euler 
function (p is defined as the number of nonnegative integers k less than n which 
are relatively prime to n: 
ip(n) = \{k\k G [1, n — 1] and gcd(A;, n) = 1 } . 
The order of Z* is given by the Euler totient function ^{n). If n is prime, 
then ip{n) = n - 1.. If n = pq such that p and q are both prime, (f{n)= 
{p — l)(q — 1). In particular, when n is a prime (p(n) = n — 1. When n = pq 
is a product of two primes, (p(n) — (p - l)(q — 1). 
In this thesis, we always consider the group QR(n) in which n = {2p' + 
l){2q' + 1) is a safe-prime product. In such case, order of the group is p'q'. 
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2.3.2 Intractable Problems 
Various cryptographic protocols rely their security on the intractability of one 
or more mathematical problems. 
Definition 13 (RSA.) Let n be a positive integer that is a product of two 
distinct odd primes p and q of the same size, e be a positive integer such that 
gcd�e, {p — l){q — 1)) = 1, and c be an integer. The RSA Problem is to find an 
integer m such that m^ = c (mod n). The RSA Assumption says that there 
exists no PPT algorithm that can solve the RSA Problem in time polynomial 
in the size of n. 
Definition 14 (Discrete Logarithm (DL).) Let G be a finite cyclic group 
generated by g £ G of order u = The discrete logarithm of some element 
a 6 G, denoted by log^(a), is the unique integer x, 0 < x < u, such that a = g^. 
The DL Problem is to find \ogg{a). The DL Assumption says that there exists 
no PPT algorithm that can solve the DL Problem, in time polynomial in the 
size of u. 
Definition 15 (Computational DifRe-Hellman (CDH).) Let G be a cyclic 
“ group generated by g e G of order u = Given g, g^ and g^ G G, the CDH 
Problem is to find the element E G. The CDH Assumption says there 
exists no PPT algorithm that can solve the CDH Problem, in time polynomial 
in the size of u. 
Obviously, if the DL problem can be solved in polynomial time, then the 
DH problem can be solved in polynomial time. For some groups, the DH and 
the DL problems have been proved to be computationally equivalent. [18, 153, 
154，155；. _ 
Definition 16 (Decisional DifRe-Hellman (DDH).) Let G be a cyclic group 
generated by g of order u = The DDH Problem is to distinguish between 
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the distributions (p, g�") and (仏 g^, gab), with a, b, c GR Z^. The DDH 
Assumption says there exists no PPT algorithm solve the DDH Problem, in 
time polynomial in the size of u. 
The DDH problem was first mentioned in [7], although there are earlier 
cryptographic systems that implicitly rely on the hardness of this problem, 
e.g. [34. 
Definition 17 (Strong RSA.) Let n = pq be an B.SA modulus. Let G he a 
cyclic subgroup o/ZJ； of order u = #G’�log2(#G01 = ic- Given n and z e G, 
the Strong RSA Problem is to find u E G and e G Z>i such that z = u^ 
mod n. The Strong RSA Assumption says that there exists no PPT algorithm 
that can solve the Strong RSA Problem, in time polynomial in the size of u. 
Remark: If n is a safe RSA modulus, it is a good habit to restrict operation 
to the subgroup of quadratic residues modulo n, i.e. the cyclic subgroup QR{n) 
generated by an element of order p'q'. This is because the order p'q' of QR{n) 
has no small factors. 
The Strong RSA Assumption was independently introduced by Baric and 
.. Pfitzmann [4] and by Fujisaki and Okamoto [51 . 
In fact, all of the intractable problems above are only believed to be in-
tractable without proof or disproof. However, one should feel fairly confidence 
on their hardness because no attacks has been successful despite the fact that 
they have been studied (or attack) for so many years. In the following, we 
briefly describe, as an example, the attacks on the DL Problem. 
Known attacks on the DL Problem can be classified into generic or specific. 
Generic attacks do not use the properties of the underlying group and can 
thus be applied to any group while specific methods exploits group-specific 
structure. Examples of generic methods are Shanks' "Baby-Step Giant-Step" 
method and Pollard's "Lambda" and "Rho" methods. The amount of work 
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that needs to be done to solve the discrete logarithm with a generic method 
grows exponentially in the size of the input. This makes groups on which no 
attacks other than generic ones are known suitable for the design of DL-based 
cryptographic protocols. 
Examples of specific methods include Index Calculus and Number Field 
Sieve algorithms. Simply speaking, these algorithms require a factor base 
which is a small suitable set of elements, and a way to decompose random 
group elements into elements of the factor base. As a result, these methods 
can only be applied to groups in which such a suitable factor base and de-
composition method exist. The only groups that are known so far that satisfy 
the stringent requirements are multiplicative groups of finite fields and class 
groups of imaginary quadratic fields. 
2.4 Cryptographic Primitives 
2.4.1 Public-Key Encryption 
Encryption schemes aim at allowing one party to send data to another in a 
confidential way. To do this, a sender "encrypt" a message into a ciphertext, 
which is then sent to the receiver, such that only the intended receiver is 
capable of retrieving the original message by "decrypting" the ciphertext. 
A public key encryption scheme is a triple of polynomial-time algorithms 
(G, E�D). The probabilistic Key Generation algorithm G generates a secret 
key X and a corresponding public key y for an entity when input the system's 
parameters. The probabilistic Encryption algorithm E takes a message m 
and a public key y as input and outputs a ciphertext c. The deterministic 
Decryption algorithm D�on input of a ciphertext c and a secret key x, outputs 
a message m. A public key encryption scheme must be correct, i.e. for all 
messages m and all key pairs (x, y) output by G, it holds that D[E(jn, y),x)= 
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m. 
The security goal of an encryption is defined as the indistinguishability 
of ciphertexts under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2), which 
roughly means the following. An adversary is given decryption oracle to which 
he can access adaptively. The adversary is then expected to give two plaintexts 
of his choice and a ciphertext of either of the plaintexts is returned with equal 
probability. The adversary is asked to distinguish the plaintext behind the 
ciphertext. Of course, the adversary is not allowed to query the decryption 
oracle on the challenge ciphertext. If the adversary cannot decide correctly 
(non-negligibly) better than pure guessing, then the ciphertext reveals no (non-
negligible) information about the plaintext behind. 
Another popular security goal of an encryption scheme is the so-called NM-
CCA2, which stands for non-malleability under adaptive chosen ciphertext 
attack. Non-malleability means that an adversary given a challenge ciphertext 
is unable to obtain a different ciphertext such that the plaintexts underlying 
these two cihpertexts are "meaningfully related". 
There exists some other weaker security models in which the attacker is 
given less power. For example, under chosen plaintext attack (CPA) the ad-
•• versary can obtain ciphertext of any plaintext; under non-adaptive chosen 
ciphertext attack (CCAl) the adversary can get access to an oracle for the 
decryption function only for the period of time preceding his being given the 
challenge ciphertext. In other words, adversary's queries to the decryption or-
acle cannot depend on the challenge ciphertext. These models are too weak to 
model the real world and should not be used as schemes proven secure under 
these models are still not guaranteed to be secure in practice. 
We give two examples of encryption schemes below. 
RSA Encryption 
The scheme is due to [90] and works as follows. 
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• Key Generation: Let p and q be two large primes such that p — 1 and q — 1 
are not smooth and n = pq. Let e be an integer satisfying gcd�e, (p(n))= 
1. The public key of a recipient Bob is the pair (n, e) and his secret key 
is the triple (p, q, d), where d satisfies de = 1 (mod (p(n)). 
• Encrypt: To encrypt a message m G [0,n - 1] for Bob, a sender Alice 
computes and sends to Bob the ciphertext c := nf mod n. 
• Decrypt: Bob can recover m using the secret value d by computing: 
m := c^ mod n. 
The security of the scheme is based on the RSA Assumption. Although 
the encryption scheme above is simple to understand and widely deployed 
in the old days, it is not secure against the IND-CCA2 model, which means 
the scheme should not be used for security reasons. The OAEP techniques 
introduced a couple of years ago wraps up the RSA encryption scheme as the 
core and is the first IND-CCA2 secure RSA-based encryption scheme. 
ElGamal Encryption 
This is due to ElGamal [ElG85a,ElG85b]. Let G be Z* where p is a large 
prime. Let p G G be a generator of G. . 
• Key Generation: Randomly pick the secret key x G/? Zp and compute 
the public key y \= g^. ‘ 
• Encryption: To encrypt a message m £ G, choose an r randomly in Zp 
and computes the ciphertext {A, B) = (p ,^ y''m). 
• Decryption: Recover m by computing 若. 
The security is based on the assumed intractability of the DHP. Again, the 
scheme above is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA2. Cramer and Shoup 
provided an IND-CCA2 secure ElGamal-based encryption scheme. 
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2.4.2 Identification Protocols 
An identification protocol aims at allowing a prover Peggy to convince a ver-
ifier Victor of her identity. The goal of such schemes is that nobody except 
than Peggy, not even Victor, is able to represent Peggy even he/she listened to 
previous identification of Peggy to Victor before. A general way to do identifi-
cation is as follows: Peggy has a secret key only known to her and a public key 
known to Victor. Victor concludes that a person is Peggy if he/she can prove 
to Victor that he/she knows Peggy's secret key. Of course, the process of such 
a proof has to be "zero-knowledge" or otherwise information about the secret 
key may leak, possibly enabling others to impersonate Peggy after listening to 
the conversation between Peggy and Victor. 
The Schnorr Identification Protocol 
The Schnorr protocol allows a prover to prove that he knows the discrete 
logarithm of a group element. In particular if the public key y and the secret 
key X are such that y = g^ ^  then the Schnorr protocol allows one to prove that 
he knows the secret key that corresponds to some public key. 
The protocol is done as follows. Both the prover and the verifier are given 
the common input the description of a finite cyclic group G of order q, an 
element g e G that generates G, an element y e G (the public key), the 
additional input to the prover is an element x G [1,^] such that y = g工(the 
secret key). The prover picks r Er Z^, computes t := g^ and sends it to the 
verifer. The verifier picks c Gr {0,1 广 and sends it to the prover. The prover 
computes s := r — cx and sends s to the verifier. The verifier outputs yes if 
g = gSye, and no otherwise. 
It is proved that if a verifier outputs yes, then the probability that the 
prover actually does not know the secret is It is also proved that if the 
verifier honestly generates the challenge, then the protocol reveals nothing 
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about he secret to the verifier. 
2.4.3 Digital Signatures 
A digital signature scheme is a triple of polynomial-time algorithms (G, 5, 
V). The probabilistic Key Generation algorithm G generates a secret key 
X and a corresponding public key y for a signer on input of the system's 
parameters. The probabilistic Signing algorithm S takes a message m and 
a secret key x as input and outputs a signature a of m. The deterministic 
Verification algorithm, on input of a message m, a signature cr, and the public 
key y, outputs either true or false. A digital signature scheme must be correct, 
i.e. for all messages m, for all key pairs (x, y) output by G, it holds that 
S(jn, x),y) = 1. 
A secure digital signature scheme must be unforgeable. The previous state-
ment is vague because unforgeability can be defined in a number of ways 
depending both on the attacks an adversary mounts and on the forgery at-
tempted. 
In regards to attacks, they range from (1) a known plaintext attack (in 
which the adversary is given a set of signatures and the respective messages), 
to (2) a chosen plaintext attack (where the adversary chooses a list of messages • 
and asks the signer for their signatures), to (3) an adaptive chosen plaintext 
attack (in which the adversary uses the signer as an "oracle", asking for sig-
natures on message of his choice). 
In terms of forgery, there are several levels of success for an attacker: (1) 
existential forgery means the adversary succeeds in obtaining a signature on 
one message, which may not be of his choice, or even meaningful; (2) selective 
forgery means the adversary obtains a signature on a message of his choice; 
(3) universal forgery means the adversary, although unable to find the secret 
key of the signer, is able to forge the signature of any message; and (4) total 
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break means the adversary succeeds in obtaining the signer's private key. 
A signature scheme is secure if it is existentially unforgeable under adaptive 
chosen message attack, meaning an adversary can not succeed in the least 
significant way, even he is mounting the strongest attack. 
The following are examples of digital signature schemes. 
RSA Signature 
The RSA signature scheme is directly derived from the RSA encryption scheme 
by reversing the roles of encryption and decryption [90]. Let H he & collision-
resistant hash function that maps {0,1}* to 
• Key Generation: Randomly pick a prime p and a generator of Z*. Ran-
domly pick an x G [0 ,p - 2] and compute y := g工 mod p. The public key 
is (仏p, y), the secret key is x). 
• Signing: Randomly pick r G [l’p - 2] that is prime to p — 1. Compute 
5i := mod p and S2 := {H(m) — xsi)r~^ mod (pi—). The signature is 
(Sl’S2). 
• Verification: A signature verifies if y^^sl^ 三 p 付 ( m o d p). 
ElGamal Signature 
Let H he a. collision-resistant hash function that maps {0,1}* to Z^. 
• Key Generation: Randomly pick two primes p and q of equal size such 
that p — I and q — 1 are not smooth, and choose an integer e such that 
‘ gcd(e, = 1, where n = pq. A signer's public key is the pair (n, e) 
and his secret key is the triple (p, q, d), where d = (mod (f{n)). 
• Signing: An RSA signature of a' message m € {0,1}* for the public key 
(n, e) is computed as a := H(mY (mod n). 
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• Verification: A signature verifies if s^ 三 / / (m) (mod n). 
A variant of the ElGamal signature scheme, called Digital Signature Al-
gorithm (DSA), is proposed as a standard by the U.S. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). The Digital Signature Standard (DSS) is 
the first digital signature scheme recognized by any government. 
Schnorr Signature 
The Schnorr signature is a variant of the ElGamal signature scheme. The 
Schnorr signature scheme is an example of the construction of a signature 
scheme from an identication protocol [203]. Compared with the ElGamal sig-
nature scheme, the Schnorr scheme provides shorter signatures for the same 
level of security. 
• Key Generation: Randomly select the secret key x e Z^. Compute the 
public key y = g^. 
• Signing: choose r GR Z^, compute c ：二 H(m\\g'^). Compute s := r — cx 
(mod q). The signature is (c, s). 
. • Verification: A signature verifies if c = H{m\\g^y^). 
2.4.4 Hash Functions 
A hash function is an efficiently computable function mapping binary strings 
of arbitrary finite length to binary strings of a fixed length i: 
if : {0,1}* —{0,1 广 
As long as cryptographic use is concerned, a hash function may have the 
following potential security properties: 
• (One-wayness.) For a given c, it is hard to find an x such that H{x) = c. 
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• (Weak collision resistance.) For a given x, it is hard to find an x' x 
such that H{x) = H{x'). 
• (Strong collision resistance.) It is hard to find a pair (x, x') with x ^ x' 
such that H{x) = H'{x) if H is chosen at random from a family of 
hash-functions. 
In the above, strong collision resistance implies weak collision resistance 
which in turn implies one-wayness. It is sufficient to assume all the hash 
functions appeared in this thesis to be weak collision resistant. 
Today, an output size of 160 bits (or larger) seems to have a reasonable 
security. 
Examples of- hash functions used in Cryptography: MD4 [88], MD5 [89], 
SHA-1 [83], and etc. 
The Random Oracle Model 
The Random Oracle Model (ROM) is a paradigm that acts as a bridge between 
cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. The idea of ROM firstly 
“ appeared in the paper written by Fiat and Shamir [46] and was formulated by 
“ Bellare and Rogaway [7]. Canetti et.al [26’ 27] presented the gap between the 
model and the real implementations. [7] raised an implicit philosophy behind 
the use of a random oracle to an explicitly articulated paradigm with which 
maintains the benefits to practice. �-
In practice, it is no formal definition to the hash functions (pseudorandom 
function family) but we capture a number of nice properties which it seems 
to possess. In the ROM, we assume hash functions are random functions 
and are publicly accessible by all parties. Random oracle, H, is an object 
to instantiate all hash functions in the model and reply all queries from the 
parties. A polynomial time algorithm cannot distinguish the query replied from 
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a real world or the random oracle simulated by a function. It has following 
properties: 
1. H is assumed to be a random function such that given an input, any 
party cannot guess the output with non-neglibible probability. 
2. F is a one-way function. Given an output, it is difficult to figure out the 
preimage of it. 
3. H : {0,1}* — {0,1}°° 
4. H is collision resistant so that given x, ？/, where x ^ y, H{x) = H{y) 
with negligible probability. 
5. Given same inputs x and y, where a: = y, H(x) = H(y). 
6. All parties in the model must query H for getting random values. They 
cannot distinguish the values generated by H from the real hash function. 
It is obvious that there exists no hash function which behaves a random 
function. ROM has an assumption that the oracle is susceptible to attack but 
in reality, it may not be true. Therefore, a protocol which is said to be provably 
secure in the random oracle model may be insecure in practice. Despite of its 
impractical assumptions, the paradigm is useful to yield an efficient solution 
to prove the security of a protocol. It is better than no proof shown. 
,� 
2.4.5 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge 
Zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge is a crucial primitive in Cryptography and 
its application can be widely found in cryptographic protocols. Speaking at a 
high level, it is a protocol run between two parties, allowing one to prove to 
another the knowledge of some secret； without leaking any information about 
the secret. We need the following definitions to make our description precise. 
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Definition 18 (Ensembles.) Let I be a countable index set. An ensemble 
indexed by I is a sequence X = where each XI is a random variable 
over {0，1}*. 
Definition 19 (Indistinguishability.) Let L G {0,1}* be a language and 
let A = {A{x)}xeL and B = {B{x)}xeL be two ensembles of random variables 
indexed by strings x ^ L. We say that the ensembles A and B are 
• perfectly indistinguishable if for all x E L the random variables A{x) 
and B(x) are identically distributed. -
• statistically indistinguishable if their statistical difference is negligible, 
or more technically, if for every polynomial p(-) and for all sufficiently 
long X ^ L it holds that 
[|Pr(A(2：) =A)- FT{B{X) = a)| < 
• computationally indistinguishable if no efficient algorithm exists that can 
distinguish them, i.e. for every PPT algorithm D, for every polynomial 
p(.) and for all sufficiently long x ^ L, 
\PT{D{X,A{X)) 二 1) -Pr (L>(a;，制）=0)1 < 
P{ X ) 
Definition 20 (Zero-knowledgeness.) An interactive protocol (7^ , V) is per-
fect/statistical/computational zero-knowledge, if for every PPT verifier V there 
exists a probabilistic expected polynomial time simulator <Sy so that the two en-
sembles 
{[V,P](a:)},eL and 
are perfectly/statistically/computationally indistinguishable. 
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Definition 21 (Honest-Verifier Zero-knowledgenes.) An interactive pro-
tocol (P, V) is perfect (statistical/computational) honest-verifier zero-knowledge, 
if there exists a probabilistic expected polynomial-time simulator Sy so that the 
two ensembles 
and {«Sv(a:)}^eL 
are perfectly (statistically/computationally) indistinguishable. 
Definition 22 (Proof of Knowledge.) Let R C {0’ 1}* x {0,1}* be a poly-
nomially bounded binary relation and let LR be the language defined by R. The 
protocol (P, V) is said to be an interactive proof of knowledge for the relation 
R if the following are satisfied: 
• (Completeness.) On common input x, if the honest prover V gets as 
private input w such that (x, w) G R，then the verifier V always accepts. 
• (Validity.) Let K be an PPT algorithm known as the knowledge extractor 
that gets as inputs anx ^ LR and rewindable black-box access to a prover 
and attempts to compute w such that (x, w) G R. Soundness means the 
- existence of K such that the following hold. For any prover V, for all 
. polynomials p(.) and for all sufficiently large x G LR, J\4 will output a a 
w such that 
~ 1 
Pr((a:, w) G i?) > FT{V convinces V on x)  
E-Protocols 
- A E-protocol for an NP-relation R is an efficient 3-round two-party protocol, 
such that for every input (x, y) to V and y to V, the first P-round yields a com-
mitment message t, the subsequent V-round replies with a random challenge 
message c, and the last 7^-round concludes by sending a response message s. 
At the end of a run, V outputs a 0/1 value, functionally dependent on y and 
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the transcript tt = {t, c, 5) only; a transcript is valid if the output of the honest 
verifier is 1. 
Additionally, we require that a S-protocol satisfies: 
• (Special Soundness.) There is an efficient algorithm K (called a Knowl-
edge Extractor) that on input any y e Lr and any pair of valid tran-
scripts with the same commitment message {t, c, s) and (t, c', 5') outputs 
X such that (x, y) G R. 
• (Special Honest- Verifier Zero-Knowledge (Special HVZK).) There is an 
efficient algorithm S (called a Simulator) that on input y 6 LR and any 
challenge message c, outputs a pair of commitment/response messages 
t, s, such that the transcript tt = {t, c, s) is valid, and it is distributed 
according to the probability distribution {V(x, y) for any y 
such that (x, y) G R. 
It can be shown that a E-protocol ('P, V) with special soundness is a proof 
of knowledge in the sense of Bellare and Goldreich [5] with knowledge error 
2 -丨by the results of Damgard and Pfitzmann [38:. 
One way to interpret the knowledge error is to think of it as the probability 
that one can convince the verifier without knowing a correct witness. To have 
a probability higher than that one must have some ability to actually compute 
the witness. 
Due to [37], if a E-protocol is HVZK, the protocol is perfectly witness 
indistinguisable (WI) [45]. Although HVZK by itself is defined with respect 
to a very much restricted verifier, i.e. an honest one, this means that if for a 
given instance a there are at least two witnesses then even an arbitrarily 
powerful and "malicious verifier cannot distinguish which witness the prover 
uses. , 
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Signature of Knowledge 
Recall that in the Random Oracle Model, protocol participants have access to 
a random oracle, which is an entity that initially chooses (in private) a random 
function R : {0,1} ' —> {0,1}^ for some t 6 N. Then any player can send any 
/-bit string a to the oracle to obtain R{a). Since R was completely random, 
R{a) is a uniformly chosen t-hit string independent of a. Also, knowing R(a) 
gives no advantage in predicting the value R{b) for any b ^  a. However, every 
time someone sends a to the oracle, the answer will be the same value R{a). 
With such an oracle, it is possible for the prover in a E-protocol to run the 
protocol without communicating with the verifier. Instead, the prover replaces 
the verifier's random choice of challenge by sending the first message to the or-
acle, and using the response as challenge. If this generated the "conversation" 
(t’c，s), the prover can send (t, s) to the verifier in one message. The verifier 
calls the oracle with t as input to get the value of c, and checks the answer s 
as it would have done normally. 
The prover cannot get an oracle response on t without calling the oracle, 
and hence he has no information about c before he has sent t. In this regard, 
the situation is equivalent to talking to a real verifier. Of course, a adversarial 
prover is now free to call the oracle as many times as he wants, hoping that he 
can obtain a challenge that he can answer. But if the number of challenges is 
exponentially large, this is infeasible for a polynomial-time adversarial prover. 
Using the random oracle has also the effect of preventing a verifier from 
cheating, or forcing the verifier to be honest. This is because the challenges are 
always randomly and independently chosen, just like the honest verifier would 
choose them. Therefore, the simulator is allowed to decide what the oracle 
outputs should be, as long as they have the same distribution indistinguishable 
from that in real life. As a result, one can simply pick c at random and run 
the normal simulator S to get a protocol conversation (t, c, 5), and assign the 
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oracle's response on input a to be e, and output (t, s). This type of construction 
has been used to make secure signature schemes from E-protocols: to generate 
keys we sample a pair (y�x) in certain hard relation R, and let the image y be 
the public key, and its witness x be the private key. To sign a message M, the 
signer executes the E-protocol in the role of the prover and computes the first 
message t. He then calls the random oracle with {t, M) as input, and takes 
the answer c as the challenge. Using his knowledge of x, he can compute the 
answer s. The signature is then the pair (亡,s). In the random oracle model, 
one can then prove that breaking this signature scheme is as hard as computing 
X from y. 
Using the techniques introduced in [46, 47], every three-round Proof of 
Knowledge Protocols (PoKs) that is Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK) 
can be turned into a signature scheme by setting the challenge to the hash value 
of the commitment together with the message to be signed. Such schemes are 
simulatable and proven secure by [86] against existential forgery under adap-
tively chosen message attack [55] in the random oracle model [7]. Simulatabil-
ity means that the distribution of the strings that can be efficiently generated 
- without knowledge of the secret signing key are indistinguishable from the 
- distribution of the actual signatures. 
A signature of knowledge allows a signer to prove the knowledge of a secret 
with respect to some public information noninteractively. The signer can also 
tie his knowledge of a secret to a message being signed. Following [25], we call 
these signature schemes "signatures based on proofs of knowledge", SPK for 
short. Note that there always exists a corresponding HVZK PoK protocol for 
every SPK. . 
Sometimes we describe proofs of knowledge not as protocols but rather as 
signature schemes derived from these protocols, since we most often use them 
as such. However, the reader should keep in mind that there always exists a 
corresponding protocol being a proof of knowledge. 
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2.4.6 Accumulators 
An accumulator family is a pair ({FA}A6N, {XAIAGN), where {Fx}xeN is a 
sequence of families of functions such that each f ^ Fx is defined as f : 
Uf X Xj^ ^ —>•[// for some XJ^^ 3 Xx and additionally the following properties 
are satisfied: 
• (Efficient generation.) There exists an efficient algorithm G that on 
input a security parameter outputs a random element / of possibly 
together with some auxiliary information a/. . 
• (Efficient evaluation.) Any / G Fa is computable in time polynomial in 
A. 
• (Quasi-commutativity.) For all A G N, / G u G Uf, Xi,X2 G Xx, 
f{f{u,Xi),X^) = f{f{u,X2),Xi). 
We will refer to {XA}AGN as the value domain of the accumulator. For any 
A e N, / G Fa and X = {xi,... ,Xs} C Xx, we will refer to / ( . . . f{u, Xi)... ,Xs) 
as the accumulated value of the set X over u. Due to quasi-commutativity, such 
value is independent of the order of the x '^s and will be denoted by f(u, X) . 
Definition 23 An accumulator is said to be collision resistant if for any A G N 
and any PPT algorithm 乂， 
_ / 从 1 
Pr u 如r, �XC-X 純 e — 
少 , � �( f 而,u) 
where z/(A) is some negligible function in 入. 
For A G N and / G Fx, we say that w e Uf is 8i witness for the fact that 
X ^ Xx has been accumulated with v E Uf (or simply that it; is a witness for 
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X in v) whenever x) = v. We extend the notion of witness for a set of 
values X = { x i , . . . , Xs} in a straightforward manner. 
An efficient construction of a collision-resistant accumulator was presented 
in [20], based on earlier work by [4] and [10 . 
Accumulators with One-Way Domain 
An accumulator with one-way domain is a quadruple {{Fx}\eN^ {X^IAGN, 
{Rx}xeN), such that the pair ({FAIAGN, {XA}A6N) is a collision-resistant accu-
mulator, and each Rx is a relation over Xx x Z\ with the following properties: 
• (Efficient verification.) There exists an efficient algorithm D that on 
input (x, z) e Xx X Zx, returns 1 if and only if {x, z) € Rx. 
• (Efficient sampling.) There exists a probabilistic algorithm W that on 
input 1入 returns a pair (x, z) e XxX Z\ such that (x, z) G R\. We refer 
to 2： as a pre-image of x. 
• (One-wayness.) It is computationally hard to compute any pre-image z' 
of an X that was sampled with W. Formally, for any PPT algorihtm A, 
Pr[(a:, x)\{x, z') e Rx] = i/(A). 
Dodis gave an efficient construction of collision resistant accumulators with 
one-way domain in [43], based on [20 . 
For 入 G N, the family Fx consists of the exponentiation functions modulo 
A-bit rigid integers 
‘ /： QR(n) X Z„/4 — QR(n) 
f : (li, x) H u^ mod n 
where n is a A-bit rigid integer. 
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The accumulator domain {Xx}xeN is defined by: 
XA = {e prime I G RSA )^ A (e G 5(2^ 2 � ) } 
where 5(2^ 2") is embedded within (0, 2 �w i t h 入 - 2 > < and £ / 2 � / / + 1. 
The pre-image domain {ZA}AGN and the one-way relation {Rx}xeN are defined 
as follows: 
Zx = {(ei,e2)|ei,62 are distinct ^/2-bit primes and 62 G 
Rx = (ei, 62)) gXA X Zx\{x = 26162 + 1)} 
2.4.7 Public Key Infrastructure 
An X.509 compliant Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is composed of three 
main entities: 
• Certification Authority (CA). the core of a PKI, it is a trusted system 
that warrants the binding between a public key and its owner by means 
' a certificate, which it signs with its private key and makes accessible 
• to all users. Certificate management is completed with certificate re-
vocation in case of accidental events, such as key compromise or less, 
that force the revocation of the certificate before its natural expiration 
date. A CA performs the following basic operations: (1) issuing end user 
certificates; (2) issuing cross-certificates for other CAs; (3) processing 
certificate revocation requests from end users and RAs; (4) generating 
periodic Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or updates thereof. 
• Registration Authority (RA). An optional system component to which 
. the CA may delegate certain fuijctions, such as verifying users' identity 
or performing the proof of possession of the private key, with the purpose 
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of reducing the accesses to the CA. A certificate signed by the CA guar-
antees its authenticity. All the communications with the CA are digitally 
signed. An RA performs the following operations: (1) vouching for the 
identity of entities requesting certification of their keys; (2) identity ver-
ification by requiring the entity to appear at the RA personally with a 
physical token or through out-of-band mechanisms; (3) verification of the 
user's possession of the private key; (4) signing an electronic certificate 
request and sending it to the appropriate CA; (5) requesting certificate 
revocations for user certificates issued by CAs that have accredited it. 
• Repository or Directory Server. A system, or a collection of distributed 
systems, that stores certficates and CRLs as distribution center for users. 
It does not need to be trusted because the CA signs the objects it deals 
with. It usually satisfies three types of requests: (1) add requests, per-
formed by the CA to publish certificates and CRL's; (2) modify requests, 
performed by the CA to change object attributes; (3) download requests, 
performed by any entity wishing to verify the validity of a certificate. 
� In a large scale PKI there might be various CAs, RAs and Repositories. 
- Each CA has one or more RAs that refer to it and can publish data in one 
or more repositories. CAs can be hierarchically organized or networked. In 
hierarchical models a CA delegates trust to subordinate CAs when it certifies 
them. Trust delegation starts at a root CA, which is trusted at every node of 
the infrastructure. In networked models, also known as cross certified models, 
trust is established between two CAs in a peer to peer relationships. The daily 
activity of issuing and revoking certificates is managed by a CA in the same 
way in both models. 
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2.5 Zero Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Pro-
tocols in Groups of Unknown Order 
2.5.1 The Algebraic Setting 
Let N he a, A-bit safe prime product and let G be the finite cyclic group 
QR{N). Let k an integer, and let g, h, gi,... ,gk ^ G be generators of G 
such that computing discrete logarithms of any group element (apart from the 
the identity element) with respect to one of the generators is infeasible. The 
generators are chosen in random, so that discrete logarithms of no generator 
with respect to another are known. 
Fujisaki and Okamota showed in [51] that, under the Strong RSA Assump-
tion, the standard proofs of knowledge protocols that work for a group of 
known order are also proofs of knowledge in this setting. The first example is 
given as follows. 
Definition 24 (Discrete Logarithm in QR{N).) Let y, g G G. A pair (c, s) e 
{0’ 1}知X士{0’ 1}<化+知)+1 verifying c = H{y\\g\\g^y^\\m) is a signature of knowl-
" edge of the discrete logarithm ofy 二 g 工 w.r.t. base g, on a message m E {0,1}*. 
The party in possession of the secret x = log^ y is able to compute the 
signature by choosing a random t € ± {0 ’ Q^IA then computing c and 
s as: 
c = H{y\\g\\g^\\m) and s = t — cx in Z. 
The security of the above has been proven in the random oracle model 
7] under the strong RSA assumption in [18, 51，52]. That is, if e > 1, then 
the corresponding interactive protocols are statistical (honest-verifier) zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge. 
In the following, we are going to describe some three-move interactive 
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HVZK PoK protocols that we will use as basic building blocks for our for-
ward secure threshold ring signature scheme. These protocols all work in fi-
nite cyclic groups of quadratic residues modulo safe prime products. For each 
i = 1,... ,n, let Ni be a safe-prime product and define the group Gi = QR{Ni) 
such that its order is of length i i — 2 for some i i G N. Also let g i , h i be 
generators of Gi such that their relative discrete logarithms are not known. 
Let 1 < e G R be a parameter and let H : {0,1}* —> Z^ be a strong 
collision-resistant hash function, where q is a. /^-bit prime for some security 
parameter k G N. Define A/‘ = { 1 , . . . , n} and F^  = {-2^'q,. • •, {2^'qY}. 
2.5.2 Proving the Knowledge of Several Discrete Loga-
rithms 
This protocol is a straightforward generalization of the protocol for proving the 
knowledge of a discrete logarithm over groups of unknown order in [18]. This 
allows a prover to prove to a verifier the knowledge of n discrete logarithms 
工1，…’工n € Z of elements ？/i,..., respectively and to the bases 仍 ， … ’ 如 
respectively. Using the notation in [25]，the protocol is denoted by: 
- n 
i二 1 
A prover V knowing Xi , . . . , G Z such that yi = g^' for all i 二 1，...，n can 
prove to a verifier V his/her knowledge as follows. 
• (Commit.) V chooses r^  Gi? 饮、议 and computes U g? for all i = 
1, . . . ,72. V sends ( t i , . . . , tn) to V. 
• (Challenge.) V chooses c ER IJQ and sends it to V. 
• (Response.) V computes, for alH = 1 , . . . , n, ^ r^  — cxi (in Z). V 
sends ( s i , . . . , to V. 
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7 
V verifies by checking, for all i = 1,... ii U = g^'y^. 
Theorem 1 If the Strong RSA assumption holds, the protocol stated in Sec. 
2.5.2 is an HVZK PoK protocol. 
Proof 1 We omit the proof as it is a straightforward extension of the proof 
of Lemma 1 in [18]. • 
As noted before, the protocol can be turned into a signature scheme by 
replacing the challenge by the hash of the commitment together with the mes-
sage M to be signed: c — H({gi,yi)\ \... 2/n)||^ i|| • • • In this 
case, the signature is (c，Si,…，Sn) and the verification becomes: 
CI H{{guyi)\\...\\{9n,yn)\\9Vyi\\.. • 
Following [25], we denote this signature scheme by: 
n 
i=l 
- 2.5.3 Proving the Knowledge of a Representation 
This protocol is a generalization (using the method described in [32]) of the 
protocol for proving the knowledge of a representation in [18]. This allows a 
prover to prove to a verifier the knowledge of the representation of an elements 
y, to the bases 仍，…，pn. Using the notation in [25], the protocol is denoted 
by： 
A prover V knowing a；!,..., G Z such that yi = gf' for all i = 1’...，n can 
prove to a verifier V his/her knowledge as follows. 
• (Commit.) V chooses r^  Gi? H�也议 and computes U g? for all i = 
1, . . . ,n . V sends ( t i , . . . , tn) to V. 
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• (Challenge.) V chooses c G/? Z^ and sends it to V. 
• (Response.) V computes, for alH = 1 , . . . , n, Sf r^  - cxi (in Z). V 
sends (Si ’ . . .，sj to V. 
V verifies by checking, ii ti.. .tn = . . . g t y � . 
Theorem 2 If the Strong RSA assumption holds, the protocol stated in Sec. 
2.5.3 is an HVZK PoK protocol. 
Proof 2 The proof is a straightforward extension from the proof of in [32] and 
18]. • 
As noted before, the protocol can be turned into a signature scheme by 
replacing the challenge by the hash of the commitment together with the mes-
sage M to be signed: c H{gi\\... ... tn\\M). In this case, the 
signature is (c, Si’...，Sn) and the verification becomes: 
c = H(gi\ \.. .\\gn\\y\\gl'... g'rTy'WM). 
Following [25], we denote this signature scheme by: 
6T i r { (a i ’ … ’ O : = … 
2.5.4 Proving the Knowledge of d Out of n Equalities of 
Discrete Logarithms 
This protocol is constructed using the techniques described in [37], by combin-
ing the PoK for discrete logarithm in [18] and the secret sharing scheme due 
to Shamir [92]. This allows a prover to prove to a verifier his/her knowledge 
of some d out of n integers X i , . . . , where Xi = log^.队=log；^. Vi for all 
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i = 1 ,…’ n. The protocol is denoted by: 
Pi^{(c^i，..•，<): V � f \ m = gTKA = h r ] >. 
y jepd([l，n]) ViGj / • 
A prover V knowing, for all i G 1，a^ i G Z such that 队= g ^ ' and Vi = 
where I is some subset of J\f such that |X| = d, can prove his/her knowledge 
to a verifier V as follows. 
• (Commit.) V does the following: For i G AT \ J, select q ^ For all 
z G A/", select r^  lL�r^ i�议.Compute 
+ f iel； J "r, lel； 
ti < and Ti — { 
\ « [ /i^r, ieM\X. 
V sends ( i i ,… ’ Ti, . . . ,T„) to V. 
• (Challenge.) V chooses c G/? Zg and sends it to V. 
• (Response.) V does the following: Compute a polynomial f of degree 
- < n — d over Zg such that /(O) = c and f(i) = Ci for ell i e Af \ 1. 
‘ Compute Ci f{i) for all i d . Set 
I ^ i — CiXi, Z G I， 
r “ i e A f \ I . 
V sends (/，Si,..., Sn) to V. 
V verifies by checking if (1) / is a polynomial of degree < n — d over Z^, (2) 
/(O) = c, and (3) U = y ! ( �^ and T, = for all i = 1’ …，n. 
Theorem 3 If the Strong RSA assumption holds, the protocol stated in Sec. 
2.5.4 is an HVZK PoK protocol. 
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{Proof Sketch) To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that the protocol 
is correct, sound and statistical HVZK. 
• (Correctness.) Straightforward. 
• (Soundness.) It suffices to show how a witness can be extracted if given 
two valid protocol conversations with the same commitment but different 
challenges. Denoting the two conversation transcripts by 
〈(亡 1,. . . ’ 亡 • . . (c), ( / , 5 i , . . . and 
((^1,..., T i , . . . , T„), (c ), ( / , S j , . . . , 5^)), 
we have c c' and thus /(O) + /'(O). As the degrees of f and f' are 
at most n — d, there are at least d distinct values TTI,...,TT /^ G {1 , . . . ,n} 
such that /(TTi) + /'(TTi) for all % — 1’...，<! Using arguments in [18], 
/(TT) — /'(TT) divides 心—s^^ and therefore an integer x such that y^ , = g， 
and IV = h，can be computed as: Xt, (s^R - s;)/(/'(7r) — /(TT)). 
Hence a witness (^ ^^ ” •..，企TTJ can be computed from two such tran-
- scripts. 
• (Statistical HVZK.) To simulate a transcript, a simulator S first chooses 
uniformly at random a polynomial f' of degree n — d over For all 
i = 1,…，n, S picks uniformly at random sj ER IL^^T、你 and computes 
t\ — gl'yf � .T h e simulated transcript is: 
〈(亡1，•..，亡n, 了 1, • . •，^n )， ( / ( 0 ) ) , ( / , "Si, . . . , S ^ ) ) . 
To prove that the simulation is statistical indistinguishable from real 
protocol conservations, one should consider, for each i = 1 , . . . , n, the 
probability distribution Psi{si) of the responses of the prover and the 
probability distribution Ps'.(s'i) according to which S chooses s-. The 
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statistical distance between the two distributions can be computed to be 
at most: 2 ( 2 ” ( g - l ) / ( 2 � ” < The result follows. 
• 
The protocol can be turned into a signature scheme by replacing the chal-
lenge by the hash of the commitment together with the message M to be 
signed: 
c H{{gi,yi,hi,vi)\\ •. • ||(如,/^ n，"n)||力i||.. • ||,n||Ti||.. • \\TN\\M). 
In this case, the signature is ( / , Si , . . . , Sn) and step (3) of the verification 
becomes: 
7 
We denote this signature scheme by: 
{ Jepd{[i,n]) V^e^ / * 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have provided all the necessary background and founda-
tions of cryptography that will be used in the subsequent chapters. We have 
given an introduction to the topics of complexity theories, algebra, number 
theory. We have reviewed various cryptographic primitives including encryp-
tion, digital signatures, etc. Finally we have elaborated on zero-knowledge 
proof of knowledge protocols. 
Chapter 3 
Related Works 
In this chapter, we survey the literature on works related to our thesis. They 
serve as a good tutorial on various security goals and notions, current state-
of-art technology, similarities and differences among schemes. We hope that 
after reading this chapter, the readers can better understand the incentives 
that drive the writing of this thesis, and at the same time better evaluate the 
contribution of this thesis. 
3.1 Introduction 
- In this section we introduce group-oriented signature schemes. In signature 
schemes that are not group-oriented, we have each entity represented by a 
single user. For example, one user signs in a conventional signature scheme, 
one user signs and one user is designated to verify in a designated-verifier 
signature scheme [31，60], etc. In group-oriented signature schemes, however, 
more than one user is representing an entity. For example, more than one 
user jointly plays the role of the signer in a threshold signature scheme [41], 
multi-signature scheme [59], etc. 
In some group-oriented signature schemes, anonymity of the signers and/or 
verifiers is not a concern and is thus riot guaranteed. These schemes are used 
when the signers feel okay about letting others know that they have helped 
43 ‘ 
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in generating a signature. These schemes may also be employed when the 
verifiers would like to know who exactly were involved in the signing process. 
On the other hand, some group-oriented signatures are not spontaneous, and 
require a proprietary setup stage before a signature can be signed even when a 
PKI already exists among the users. Spontaneity is a nice property for group-
oriented signature schemes because it gets rid of the need of a powerful and/or 
trusted group manager. Among some of the various group-oriented signature 
schemes, threshold signatures and group signatures are not spontaneous, multi-
signatures, aggregated signatures and designated verifiers signatures are not 
anonymous. 
In the next two subsections, we give a review on both group-oriented signa-
ture schemes without spontaneity and/or anonymity and spontaneous anony-
mous group-oriented (SAG) signature schemes. 
3.2 Group-Oriented Signatures without Spon-
taneity and/or Anonymity 
We briefly review group-oriented signature schemes without spontaneity and/or 
anonymity in the following. 
THRESHOLD SIGNATURES. The secret key is distributed among n parties in 
a threshold signature scheme either with the help of a trusted dealer or by run-
ning an interactive protocol among all parties. To sign a message M any t (but 
not less) parties use their shares of the secret and run an signature generation 
protocol. A secure threshold signature scheme must make existential forgery 
impossible even if some t—1 parties have been corrupted. Non-interactiveness 
means the participating signers need not communicate in the process of sig-
nature generation. If a threshold signature scheme is robust, a signature can 
still be generated if number of the signers acting adversarily is within a certain 
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limit. Research in the literature: [41, 39, 49, 57, 50, 87, 54，93, 71, 11, 102, 35 . 
MULTI-SIGNATURES. In a multi-signature scheme, any subgroup of a group 
of players jointly sign a document such that a verifier is convinced that each 
member of the subgroup participated in signing. The difference between multi-
signatures and threshold signatures is the following: multi-signatures prove 
that each member of the stated subgroup signed the message while threshold 
signatures prove that some subgroup of sufficient size signed the message. 
Research in the literature: [59, 84, 57, 66, 58, 85，74, 11, 101；. 
VERIFIER DESIGNATED SIGNATURES. Verifier designated signature ( V D S ) 
schemes, independently proposed in [31] and [60] are such that a signature can 
only be verified by the verifier who is designated. Recently, Desmedt suggested 
in [40] to generalize the number of verifiers to an arbitrary number. The gen-
eralized scheme becomes obviously a group-oriented scheme. Laguillaumie, et 
al. [65] proposed a VDS scheme that hides the signer's identity among a group 
of possible signers, by incorporating the ring structure [91]. The same authors 
also proposed in [64] a signer-anonymous multi-designated verifier signature 
scheme. Papers in this topic include: [31, 60, 65, 64 . 
- Note that the identities of designated verifiers are known to the public in 
, all existing multi-designated verifier signature schemes, even in those in which 
signers are anonymous. 
GROUP SIGNATURES. Introduced by Chaum in [34], group signatures al-
low a member to sign messages anonymously on behalf of his group. The 
group manager is responsible to form the group and assign to the members 
the ability to sign. However, in the case of a dispute, the identity of a sig-
nature's originator can be revealed (only) by a designated entity. The first 
efficient and provably secure group signature scheme was due to [3]. The re-
quirement of group setup by the group manager in group signature schemes 
prevents them from being spontaneous. There has been fruitful research since 
then: [19, 21, 13, 22, 82, 78，75’ 53, 8:. 
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Teranishi, et al. [95] proposed an authentication scheme in which users can 
be authenticated anonymously so long as times that they are authenticated is 
within an allowable number. In the scheme, no one is capable of identifying 
users who have been authenticated within the allowable number; but anyone 
can trace dishonest users who have been authenticated beyond the allowable 
number. When one regards signature schemes as the non-interactive version 
of authentication, [95] can actually be regarded as a group signature with 
linkability [76, 77, 68] or a credential system [19, 19, 20, 22’ 70] with multi but 
restricted number of shows. • 
3.3 SAG Signatures 
As discussed above, SAG signatures are group-oriented signatures that are both 
spontaneous and anonymous (anonymity usually refers to that of the signers). 
They are thus sometimes regarded as group signatures with spontaneity: there 
is no group setup (either by a group manager or through interactions among 
users). 
- RING SIGNATURES. The first SAG signature scheme is due to Rivest, et 
- al. [91] which has a structure of a ring and was thus given the name ring 
signatures. The notion "ring signatures" is, however, sometimes exploited a 
little bit to mean SAG signatures in general, and has nothing to do with the 
structure of the construction itself. We also adopt this nomenclature in this 
paper and refer to SAG signatures as ring signatures from time to time. On 
the other hand, when we say an SAG signature scheme is of ring-type, we 
mean the scheme has a structure of a ring, similar to that in [91 . ^ • 
The construction of SAG signatures actually dates back to [37] in which 
partial proof of knowledge was introduced. Such a proof protocol allows a 
prover to prove to a verifier his knowledge of a witness behind certain relation 
among a set of relations. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics [46], the protocol 
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can be transformed into a signature scheme and results in a group signature 
scheme (secure in the Random Oracle model [7]) that enjoys spontaneity as 
well as anonymity. SAG signature schemes constructed this way are often 
referred to as of CDS-type. Note that it is trivial to extend a CDS-type, but 
not a ring-type, SAG signature scheme into a threshold setting with the same 
order computational and storage efficiency. 
Most of the SAG signature schemes in the literature today either adopt 
a ring structure or a CDS structure in their construction. However there are 
exceptions. For example, Boneh, et al.'s ring signature scheme [14] makes use 
of bilinearity of pairings to achieve its goal. 
Abe, et al. [1] gave a construction of ring signatures, with separability 
taken into account. Separability was introduced in [63] and diversified in [23 
to describe the users' ability to choose their own cryptographic primitive and 
system parameters. Consult [23] for various levels of separability. Separability 
is of vital importance in SAG cryptography as there is no group manager or 
trusted third party to coordinate the choice of primitives and system parame-
ters for each user. For instance, a SAG signature scheme that is not separable 
_ is not practical at all as it is unlikely to have all group members using the 
- same primitive, system parameters and security parameters. 
Dodis, et al [43] proposed an anonymous identification scheme that allows 
participants from a user population to form ad hoc groups, and then prove 
membership anonymously in such groups. Using the Fiat-Shamir transform 
46], a signer-ambiguous SAG signature scheme can be obtained. It is the first 
SAG signature scheme that has a constant signature size (independent of the 
size of the group). 
Regarding the security of SAG signature schemes, a secure SAG signature 
scheme must be unforgeable and anonymous. Roughly speaking, unforgeabil-
ity means a valid signature can only be generated by a group member while 
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anonymity means no one can decide the origin of a signature better than ran-
dom guessing. Papers that concern about security model for SAG signature 
schemes include: [91, 1, 69 . 
THRESHOLD RING SIGNATURES. Threshold cryptography [41] allows n 
parties to share the ability to perform a cryptographic operation (e.g., creating 
a digital signature). Any d parties can perform the operation jointly, whereas 
it is infeasible for at most c? — 1 to do so. In a {d, n)-threshold ring signature 
scheme, the generation of a ring signature for a group of n members requires 
the involvement of at least d members/signers, and yet the signature reveals 
nothing about the identities of the signers. A threshold ring signature scheme 
effectively proves that a certain minimum number of users of a certain group 
must have actually collaborated to produce the signature, while hiding the 
precise membership of the subgroup. 
Bresson, et al. [16] was the first to study ad-hoc ring signatures, which is a 
generalization of threshold ring signatures. An ad-hoc group is a list of users, 
including certified public keys, accompanied by a list of subsets of these users, 
called the acceptable subsets. This second list may be optionally replaced 
with a predicate defining exactly which subsets are acceptable. Ad-hoc ring 
一 signatures prove that the signing members all belong to at least one acceptable 
subset. Other threshold ring signature schemes include: [100, 67 . 
BLIND RING SIGNATURES. While ring signatures protect the anonymity 
of the signer, the blindness in blind ring signatures blinds the messages to be 
signed against the signer. The first blind ring signatures were introduced by 
Chan, et al. [28]. Based on essentially any major blind signature scheme, 
they constructed ring-type 1-out-of-n blind ring signatures and CDS-type t-
out-of-n blind ring signatures. The blindness of the various resulted blind 
ring signature schemes depends on that of their respective underlying blind 
signature schemes. 
LINKABLE RING SIGNATURES. Liu, et al. [68] gave the first linkable ring 
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signatures. Linkability in ring signatures allow anyone to determine if they 
are signed by the same group member (i.e. they are linked). If a user signs 
only once on behalf of a group, he still enjoys anonymity similar to that in 
conventional ring signature schemes. If the user signs multiple times, anyone 
can tell that these signatures have been generated by the same group member. 
Applications include leaking sequences of secrets, e-voting [68], offline anony-
mous electronic cash systems, direct anonymous attestations [97] and restricted 
one-show credential systems [70 . 
DENIABLE RING AUTHENTICATION. The notion was introduced by Naor 
79]. In a deniable ring authentication, it is possible to convince a verifier that 
a member of an ad hoc collection of participants is authenticating a message 
without revealing which one and the verifier cannot convince any third party 
that the message was indeed authenticated. 
Susilo, et al. later proposed a non-interactive version [94] which can get rid 
of inefficient implementation of anonymous channel. They also presented in the 
same paper an extension of this idea to allow a non-interactive deniable ring 
to threshold ring authentication. In this scenario, the signature can convince 
_ a group of verifiers, but the verifiers cannot convince any other third party 
„ about this fact, because any collusion of t verifiers can always generate a valid 
message-signature pair. 
3.4 Conclusion . 
In this chapter, we have surveyed the literature on works related to our thesis. 
They serve as a good tutorial on various security goals and notions, current 
state-of-art technology, similarities and differences among schemes. We hope 
that after reading this chapter, the readers can better understand the incentives 
that drive the writing of this thesis, and at the same time better evaluate the 
contribution of this thesis. 
Chapter 4 
Linkable Ring Signatures 
In this chapter, we investigate in depth one extension of ring signatures, namely 
the linkable ring signatures. We first give an introduction of linkable ring sig-
natures and the significance of linkability in ring signatures. Then we introduce 
notions novel to linkable ring signatures, together with discussion on their im-
portance and impact. Finally we give a fully developed security model that 
captures the security requirements of linkable ring signature schemes under 
various possible adversarial attacks. 
4.1 Introduction 
Linkable ring signatures [68] are ring signatures, but with added linkability: 
such signatures allow anyone to determine if they are signed by the same group 
member (i.e. they are linked). If a user signs only once on behalf of a group, he 
still enjoys anonymity similar to that in conventional ring signature schemes. 
If the user signs multiple times, anyone can tell that these signatures have been 
generated by the same group member. Applications include leaking sequences 
of secrets and e-voting [68]. Concepts similar to linkability also appeared in 
one-show credentials [19], linkable group signatures [76, 77], and DAA [17 . 
The most crucial significance of linkability in ring signatures is to take away 
their perfect anonymity and thus making them suitable for new applications. 
50 ‘ 
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Ring signatures provide anonymity in a very strong sense: signatures signed 
by different users are statistically indistinguishable from each other, meaning 
even adversaries with infinite power cannot tell who actually signed. The only 
way to reveal the identity is to have the actual signer cooperate by either 
revealing his secret or going through some (non-)interactive proof protocols. 
While this is excellent to provide users with perfect anonymity, such a scheme 
is not suitable when absolute anonymity is a threat. In fact, in not many 
situations is perfect anonymity required. On the contrary, there are lots of 
applications in which information about the identity of the actual signer can 
be obtained. Group signatures is definitely a clear example: anonymity is 
preserved except to the revocation manager, who can open a signature in 
case of a dispute or under a court order. Linkability can be thought of a 
mechanism that leak partial information about signer's identity if a predefined 
criterion is met. When compared to group signatures, linkable ring signatures 
offer a distinct feature that is possibly advantageous in certain applications: In 
group signatures, the revocation manager is empowered to open any signatures; 
while in linkable ring signatures, no one has a clue to a signature's originality, 
_ provided that the predefined criterion (namely double-signing) is not met. 
Our Contributions in this Chapter 
• We introduce new notions to linkable ring signatures: (1) Non-accusatory 
linkability only detects the presence of two "linked" signatures, while 
accusatory linkability additionally outputs the identity of the suspected 
"double-signer". .(2) Non-slanderability means no coalition can generate 
signatures accusatorily linked to a targeted victim. (3) We clarify the 
meaning of linkability in linkable threshold ring signature schemes. 
• We formally define the “event-oriented,, linking criterion. Under such 
linkability, one can tell if two signatures are linked if and only if they are 
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signed for the same event, despite the fact that they may be signed on 
behalf of different groups. 
• We give a fully developed security model that captures the security re-
quirements of generic linkable ring signature schemes under various pos-
sible adversarial attacks. 
4.2 New Notions 
4.2.1 Accusatory Linking 
In the first linkable ring signature scheme due to [68], the linking algorithm 
can tell if two input signatures are linked or not, meaning whether or not they 
are signed by the same member of a group. The boolean answer given by 
the linking algorithm reveals nothing about the actual identity of the signer, 
even if two signatures are linked. Linkability in a ring signature scheme is good 
because it serves as a mechanism to hinder "double-signing". A signer, knowing 
"double-signing" is detectable, loses interest to so do. A good example to 
illustrate the idea is when linkable ring signatures are used for electronic voting. 
A linkable ring signature is signed on a to-be-casted ballot to authenticate its 
eligibility. An adversarial voter may want to vote twice or more to unfairly 
put his favorable candidate into a more advantageous position. If the voting 
authority throws away all the votes with linked signatures, the adversary has 
no longer the incentive to "double-vote", because not only can't he vote twice 
or more, his originally legitimate ballot will be discarded as well. We call 
linking without being able to figure out the identity of the double-signer Non-
accusatory Linking. 
However, there are occasions when non-accusatory linking is not good 
enough to prevent double-signing. This may happen when (1) there is nothing 
to lose for a signer to double-sign, or (2) linkability test is done after, instead 
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of concurrently with, the verification of a signature. The consequences of the 
former case is easy to see. Because the signer has nothing to lose, he is happy 
to sign thousands of times, in the hope of two or more signatures are unde-
tected as unlinked. He may also desperately sign a countless number of times 
to keep the linkability checking authority busy, which results in a denial of 
service attack. 
In the latter case, linkability test is done after the verification of a signature. 
The best example to explain the potential problem raised is perhaps offline 
anonymous eletronic cash systems that make use of linkable ring signatures. 
In such systems, each signature represents a coin to be spent. Double-signing 
has in this case the physical meaning of double-spending, i.e. spending the 
same coin twice. Since linking is done only when a coin is deposited at the 
bank by the merchant, the merchant is only able to verify its validity, but has 
no way to know if the coin is being double-spent. A double spender, having 
benefited by exchanging the double-spent coins with the goods or service from 
the merchant, does not care that the coins will be linked at a later time. 
Switching the whole system into an online one is a trivial solution because 
_ linkability can be tested during payment. But if being online is not what 
’ we want, we need to figure out the identity of the double signer from two 
linked signatures, so as to punish him for double signing. When a linkable 
ring signature scheme is able to identify the double signer from two linked 
signatures, We call it Accusatory Linking. 
4.2.2 Non-slanderability 
Roughly speaking, non-slanderability means no one can produce a valid sig-
nature that is linked to a given signature, except the one who actually signed 
that signature. The full definition of non-slanderability is given in the security 
model later in this chapter. 
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Non-slanderability is important for linkable ring signature schemes because 
schemes that are slanderable can cause so much problems and make it unsuit-
able to be employed for practical use. Again we demonstrate the idea by 
the example of electronic voting. In electronic voting, linked signatures are 
dropped. Therefore, in a linkable ring signature scheme is slanderable, even if 
a honest voter never double vote, it is possible that his vote is dropped because 
someone is able to produce a valid signature that is linked to the honest voter. 
As a result, an adversary can void any votes as he wish. He can practically 
ruin the whole voting event or control the winner in the event. 
4.2.3 Linkability in Threshold Ring Signatures 
While it is trivial what linkability means in conventional ring signatures, linka-
bility in threshold ring signatures requires a more precise definition. In particu-
lar, there are at least two possibilities that we define as being coalition-linkable 
and individual-linkable as follows. 
Definition 25 (Coalition-linkability.) A linkable threshold ring signature 
scheme is coalition-linkable if two signatures are linked if and only if they are 
_ signed by exactly the same set of signers. 
Definition 26 (Individual-linkability.) A linkable threshold ring signature 
scheme is individual-linkable if two signatures are linked if and only if they 
involve a common signer. 
In a linkable threshold ring signature scheme that is coalition-linkable, users 
are able to sign multiple times without their signatures being linked, as long as 
they are not collaborating with exactly the same set of signers again. However, 
in a scheme that is individual-linkable, no matter who other collaborating 
signers are a user signing more than once will have the signatures linked. The 
scheme we present in this paper falls into the later category. 
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4.2.4 Event-Oriented Linking 
In the first linkable ring signature scheme [68]，one can tell if two ring signatures 
are linked or not if and only if they are signed on behalf of the same group 
of members. We call this “group-oriented” linkability. We formulate a new 
linking criterion that we call “ event-oriented” linkability in which one can tell 
if two signatures are linked if and only if they are signed for the same event, 
despite that they may be signed on behalf of different groups. 
Event-oriented linkable ring signatures are comparatively more flexible in 
application. We illustrate by the following two examples: 
Example 1 group settings keep changing frequently in ad-hoc groups and 
most of the ring signatures are signed on behalf of different groups, thus ren-
dering group-oriented linkability virtually useless. 
Example 2 The CEOs of a company vote for business decisions. Using link-
able ring signatures, they can vote anonymously by ring-signing their votes. 
However, as the group is fixed throughout the polls, votes among polls can be 
linked by anybody and information can be derived which means anonymity is 
" in jeopardy. This can be prevented when an event-oriented scheme is used. 
In deploying a linkable (threshold) ring signature scheme that supports 
event-oriented linking, event-ids should be chosen with great care. Here we 
give two examples. 
Example 3 When the scheme is used to leak sequences of secrets, the "whistle-
blower" should choose an event-id that has never been used before when leaking 
the first secret and then stick to using the same later on. This guarantees the 
sequence of secrets cannot be linked to other sequences. 
Example 4 When the scheme is used in electronic voting, it is usually the 
voting organizer (e.g. the government) who decides on an event-id. Each 
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eligible voter should therefore, before they cast a vote, make sure that the 
event-id has not been used in any previous voting event, so as to secure the 
intended privacy. 
4.3 Security Model 
We give our security model and define relevant security notions. 
4.3.1 Syntax 
A Linkable Threshold Ring Signature (LTRS) scheme, is a tuple of five algo-
rithms (Init, Key-Gen, Sign, Verify and Link). 
• param ln i t ( l� , a P P T Initialization algorithm which, on input a se-
curity parameter A G N, outputs the set of system's parameters param 
which also includes 
• (ski^pki) — Key-Gen(param, a PPT Key Generation algorithm which, 
on input the system's parameters param and a further security parameter 
- A^  G N such that Ai 2 A, outputs a secret/public key pair (ski^pki). We 
" denote by SIC and VJC the domains of possible secret keys and public 
keys, resp. When we say that a public key corresponds to a secret key 
or vice versa, we mean that the secret/public key pair is an output of 
Key-Gen. .、 
• cr Sign(param, e, n, d, y, M, X), a PPT Signing algorithm which, on 
input the set of system's parameters param, an event-id e G {0,1}*, a 
group size n G N with size polynomial in A, a threshold d G [1,n], a 
set y of n public keys in VK�a message M G {0,1}*, and a set X 
of d private keys in SK whose corresponding public keys are contained 
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in 乂 produces a signature a. We denote by E the domain of possi-
ble signatures. For convenience define the augmented signature aaux as 
(param, e, n, d, y, M, a). 
• 1/0 一 Verify (param, e, n, d, y, M, a), a polynomial-time Verification al-
gorithm which, on input the set of system's parameters param, an event-
id e € {0’ 1}*, a group size n G N with size polynomial in A, a threshold 
d G [1, n], a set y of n public keys in VK, a message M G {0,1}* and 
a signature a G S, returns 1 or 0 for accept or re ject respectively. If 
the algorithm returns accept, the message-signature pair (M, a) is said 
to be valid (w.r.t . (param, e, n, d, y)). 
• 1/0 Link(ai2c, oil!) , a polynomial-time Linking algorithm which, 
upon input two valid augmented signatures with respect to the same set 
of system's parameters param and event-id e, outputs 1 or 0 for linked or 
unlinked, resp. If the scheme's linkability is accusatory, the algorithm 
additionally outputs the public key pksus of the suspected "double-signer" 
in case of linked. 
‘ The syntax for a Linkable Ring Signature (LRS) is a straightforward special 
case of the above when the threshold value d is always 1. For schemes that 
do not support events, one may simply assume they support a single event-id. 
Therefore, the above syntax incorporates linkable ring signature schemes no 
matter they support thresholding and/or events or not. 
Correctness 
LTRS schemes must satisfy: 
• (Verification Correctness.) Signatures signed according to specification 
are accepted during verification；' with overwhelming probability. 
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• (Linking Correctness.) Two signatures signed for the same event accord-
ing to specification are linked with overwhelming probability if the two 
signatures share a common signer. On the other hand, two signatures 
signed for the same event according to specification are unlinked with 
overwhelming probability if the two signatures do NOT share a common 
signer. In case linkability is accusatory, the suspect output by the algo-
rithm Link is, with overwhelming probability, the common signer when 
the two input signatures are linked. 
4.3.2 Notions of Security 
The security of a LTRS scheme has four aspects: unforgeability, linkable 
anonymity, linkability, and non-slanderability. Before giving their definition, 
we consider the following oracles which together model the ability of the ad-
versaries in breaking the security of the scheme. 
• The Joining Oracle JO. Upon request, it adds a new user to the system 
and then returns the public key pk G VIC of that new user. 
" • The Corruption Oracle CO. On input a public key pki that is a query 
• output of JO, it returns the corresponding secret key ski ^ SIC. 
• The Signing Oracle SO. On input an event-id e G {0,1}*, a group 
size n G N of size polynomial in the security parameter A, a threshold 
d G [1, n], a set y of n public keys that are query outputs of JO, a 
message M G {0,1}*, and a set V C of size d, it returns a valid 
signature a signed by the users with pubic keys in V. 
Remark: An alternative approach to specify the SO is to exclude the signer 
set V from the input and have SO select it according to suitable random 
distribution. We do not pursue that alternative further. 
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Unforgeability 
Definition 27 (Game Unf.) Unforgeability for LTRS schemes is defined in 
the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A 
is given access to oracles JO, CO and SO: 
1. (Initialization Phase.) S generates and gives A the system's parameters 
pa ram. 
2. (Probing Phase.) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive 
strategy. 
3. (Challenge Phase.) A gives S an event-id e G {0,1}*, a group size n G N 
of size polynomial in A, a threshold d G [1, n], a set y of n public keys 
in VIC, a message M G {0,1}* and a signature cr G E. 
In the above game, A wins if: 
1. Verify (pa ram, e, n, d, y, M, cr) = 1, 
2. all of the public keys in y are query outputs of JO, 
3. at most {d — 1) of the public keys in have been input to CO, and 
4. cr is not a query output of SO on any input containing M. 
We denote by AdvT^^(A) the probability of A winning the game. 
Definition 28 (Unforgeability.) An LRS scheme is unforgeable if for all 
PPT adversary A, is negligible. 
Linkable Anonymity 
Definition 29 (Game L-Anon.) Linkable anonymity for LTRS schemes is 
defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A 
in which A is given access to oracles JO, CO and SO: 
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1. (Initialization Phase.) S generates and gives A the system,s parameters 
pa ram. 
2. (Probing Phase I.) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive 
strategy. 
3. (Challenge Phase.) A gives S an event-id e*, a group size n* G N of size 
polynomial in X, a threshold d* G [1, n*], a message M*，a set y* of n* 
public keys that are query outputs of JO, a set V* C 3^ * of size d*, a 
public key y* € V* that has never been input to CO or included in the 
insider set V in any query to SO. Let x* be the secret key corresponding 
to y* and U* he the set of secret keys corresponding to the public keys 
contained in V* . 
S then selects b G/? {0,1}. Case b = 0: S computes a* by executing the 
algorithm Sign on the input tuple {param^ e * , M""). Case 
b=l: S computes a* = SO (e\ n\ d% V\ M”. 
S sends a* to A. 
4- (Probing Phase II.) A queries the oracles adaptively, except that y* can-
not be queried to CO or included in the insider set V of any query to 
‘ 5(9. 
5. (End Game.) A delivers an estimate b e {0,1} of b. 
In the above game, A wins if 6 = 6. - We denote by Adv么-如"(A) the 
probability of A winning the game over one-half. 
Definition 30 (Linkable Anonymity.) An LTRS scheme is linkably anony-
mous if for any PPT adversary A, Adv么—力“。几(A) is negligible. 
Remark: Linkable anonymity is a form of computational zero-knowledge: 
the attacker cannot computationally distinguish the real world from the sim-
ulated world. Note that the anonymity notions in [6, 9, 61] appear to be 
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also computational zero-knowledge. Our attacker model is not a fully active 
attacker: queries relevant to the gauntlet public key, yg, are ruled out. The 
anonymity in [68] is also with respect to the above model. We note that [6], 
p.623，argued that anonymity and linkability cannot coexist in their security 
model. 
Linkability 
Definition 31 (Game Link.) Linkability for LTRS schemes is defined in the 
following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A is 
given access to oracles JO, CO and SO: 
1. (Initialization Phase.) S generates and gives A the system's parameters 
pa ram. 
2. (Probing Phase.) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive 
strategy. 
3. (Challenge Phase.) A gives S an event-id e G {0,1}*, group sizes 
n⑴,n⑶ e N，thresholds d � G [l’ri(i)]’ci⑵ G [l,n(2)]，sets ： ^ � and 
of public keys that are query outputs of JO of sizes n � and n � 
respectively, messages M � ,M � G {0,1}* and signatures c r � ’ a � e S. 
In the above game, A wins if 
1. all public keys in U are query outputs of JO, 
2. Verify{param, e, n � ,d �,M � ,a � ) = 1 fori = 1,2， 
_ 3. at most ( D � + d � -1 ) public keys in ；V � U � has been queried to CO, 
and 
4- criul) = 0. ’， 
We denote by Adv;^—(A) the probability of A winning the game. 
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Definition 32 (Linkability.) An LRS scheme is linkable if for all PPT ad-
versary A, Adv父"、A) is negligible. 
Non-Slanderability 
Definition 33 (Game N-Sland.) Non-Slanderability for LTRS schemes is 
defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A 
in which A is given access to oracles JO, CO and SO: 
1. (Initialization Phase.) S generates and gives A the system's parameters 
param. 
2. (Probing Phase I.) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive 
strategy. 
3. (Challenge Phase.) A gives S an event id e* G {0,1}*， a group size 
n* G N of size polynomial in 入，a threshold d* G [1, n*], a set y* of n* 
public keys, a message M* G { 0 , 1 } * and a set V* C y* of size d*. No 
public key in V* has been queried to CO or included in the insider set V 
of any query to SO. S returns a valid augmented signature cr:则 signed 
‘ by users with public keys in V*. 
4- (Probing Phase II.) A queries the oracles adaptively, except that no public 
key in V* can be queried to CO or included in the insider set V of any 
query to SO. 
5. (End Game.) A gives S a group size h ^ N of size polynomial in X, 
A A 
a threshold d G [1, h], a set y of public keys that are query outputs of 
A. A  
, JO of size d, a message M G {0,1}* and a signature a G E . Define 
A A 
^aux = iparam,e*,n,d,y,M,a). 
In the above game, A wins if: 
A A A 
1. Verify (pa ram, e*, n, d, y, = 1 
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2. Link(心工,(3•隱）=1. 
We denote by Adv�〜） the probability of A winning the game. 
Definition 34 (Non-Slanderability) An LTRS scheme is non-slanderable 
if for all PPT adversary A, Adv�"^ is negligible. 
Security 
Summarizing we have: 
Definition 35 (Security of LTRS Schemes.) An LTRS scheme is secure 
if it is unforgeable, linkably-anonymous, linkable and non-slanderable. 
The model for a Linkable Ring Signature (LRS) is a straightforward special 
case of the above when the threshold value d is always 1. For schemes that 
do not support events, one may simply assume they support a single event-id. 
Therefore, the above model incorporates linkable ring signature schemes no 
matter they support thresholding and/or events or not. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have investigated in depth the linkable ring signatures. 
We have given an introduction of linkable ring signatures and the significance 
of linkability in ring signatures. We have introduced notions novel to link-
able ring signatures, together with discussion on their importance and impact. 
Finally we have given a fully developed security model that captures the se-
curity requirements of linkable ring signature schemes under various possible 
adversarial attacks. 
Chapter 5 
Short Linkable Ring Signatures 
In this chapter, we propose the first short linkable ring signature scheme con-
struction. By short we mean the signature size is independent of the size of 
the member group a signature is signed on behalf of. Being short enables link-
able ring signatures to be scalable and deployed in large-scale scenarios. We 
propose a new mathematical assumption and then reduce the security of our 
construction to it plus several well-known mathematical assumptions. 
5.1 Introduction 
Signature size is a crucial factor for group-oriented signature schemes. Usually 
it is measured as the rate of growth in size with respect to the group s ize�For 
example, we say a signature scheme is of signature size 0{n) if the signature 
size grows linearly with the group size n; a scheme is of 0(1) if the signature 
size is a constant and independent of n (in which case we call the scheme 
"short"). Being short is the key to scalability because the signature size can 
be kept small even if the group size grows extensively. In other words, a 
signature scheme that is not short may be practical in a small-group setting, it 
is unsuitable to be deployed in applications in which a large group is expected. 
iQf course, there could be other factors afltecting the group size. For example, in some 
construction of threshold group/ring signature schemes, the signature size grows linearly 
also with the threshold value. 
64 ‘ 
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Example 5 Consider the case when a linkable ring signature with linearly-
growing signature size is used in electronic voting in order to authenticate a 
ballot. Assume the signature size is 0.5 KB per group member^. If 100 people 
are involved in a poll within the conference room, then each signature will have 
an acceptable size of 50 KB. However, 500 MB will be occupied by a single 
signature if 1 million people are involved, in a community-wide election, for 
example. Not only is it very demanding for a voter to cast his ballot, it is 
also a headache for the authority to securely maintain all the 1 million bulky 
ballots. 
Our Contributions in this Chapter 
Our contribution in this chapter includes the following: 
• We extend the short ring signature scheme construction of Dodis, et al. 
43] to the first short linkable ring signature scheme construction. 
• We introduce a new hardness assumption, the Link Decisional RSA (LD-
RSA) Assumption, and prove the security of our proposed scheme to the 
_ assumption as well as some other well-established hardness assumption. 
5.2 The Construction 
In this section, we give a concrete linkable ring signature (LRS) scheme con-
struction . W e then show that such the construction is secure under the security 
model defined in Chapter 4. 
• I nit. On input security parameter the algorithm prepares a collision-
resistant accumulator with one-way domain according to Dodis et al. 
(refer to section 2.4.6 for details). Define desc to be the description of the 
^The value is estimated by assuming 4 strings of 1024 bits are needed per group member. 
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accumulator. The algorithm picks a random generator g € QR{N) for 
the group QR{N)^ where N is defined in desc, and outputs the system's 
parameters param := (1^, desc,g). 
• Key-Gen. On input the system's parameters param, the algorithm parses 
param into (l\desc,釣 and then executes the probabilistic sampling al-
gorithm W of the accumulator to obtain (y ,^ (pi, Qi)). Finally it outputs 
the key pair (ski^pki), where ski '•= fe, qi) and pki := yi. 
• Sign. On input the system's parameters param, a group size n G N of size 
polynomial in A, a public key set y = {p/ci,... ,pkn} where all phi's are 
in VIC, a message M G {0,1}* and a private key sAv that corresponds 
to p/tTT G y , the algorithm parses parses param into (]/，desc, g), each pki 
into its respective 认 and sk^ ^ into its respective (；^，Q-n)- It then does the 
following: 
1. Compute the witness w for y^^ as w := /(w, {yi\i G [1, n]\7r}) and 
then the accumulated value v of all public keys as v := f{w, Ut^). 
2. Compute a signature for 
1 / s w^ = V mod N A X = 2eie2 + 1 A 
I ) : X G 5(2^2^) A 62 A (M). 
\ J ~ =yi+e2 
(5.1) 
The above SPK is instantiated as follows. Randomly pick r ER 
0, N/A]. Compute ai := xr and a2 ：= e2r in Z, and T\ := 
T2 := g^ I^f, T3 T4 w f , T5 := g^ H"- and y : =沪 ^^  
QR{N). y is the linkability tag. Then execute the following SPK: 
3. Denote by a' be the output after the execution of the SPK above. 
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‘ A = g工 hr A 、 
T f =ga i A T - =g叩 A 
SPKl 工 ， : T, = gels' A T: = vy^' A (M) . 
\ei’e2 乂 J.2e2g = g中2 八 0 =�1+62 A 
x G A 62 G 5(2^/2, 
(5.2) 
The signature a returned by the algorithm is given by 
cr ：= (7；’7\’...’了5,仏(7'). 
• Verify. On input the system's parameters param, a group size n G N of 
size polynomial in A, a public key set = {pki^... ,pkn} with pki 6 VIC 
for all i G [1, n], a message M € {0,1}* and a signature cr G E, 
the algorithm parses param into ( l\desc ,孙 each pki into its respec-
tive yi, and a into … 仏 a'"). It then verifies the statement 
7 
V = f{u, {yi\i G [1, n]}) and the validity of a' with respect to the SPK 
represented by Equation (5.2). It returns accept if both checks pass and 
‘ reject otherwise. 
• Link. Given two valid signatures the algorithm extracts their respective 
linkability tag yi and 仏.It returns linked if they are the same and 
unlinked otherwise. 
Correctness 
Verification correctness is straightforward. It is basically implied by the cor-
rectness of the SPK. Linking correctness is also easy to see by noting the fact 
that the linkability tag y is unique for unique (ei, 62) in the secret key, with 
overwhelming probability in A. ‘ 
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5.3 Security Analysis 
5.3.1 Security Theorems 
Lemma 1 (Unforgeability.) Our construction is unforgeable under the Strong 
RSA assumption in the random oracle model. 
Lemma 2 (Linkable-anonymity.) Our construction is anonymous under 
the DDH over QR{N) assumption and LD-RSA assumption in the random 
oracle model 
Lemma 3 (Linkability.) Our construction is linkable under the Strong RSA 
assumption in the random oracle model. 
Lemma 4 (Non-slanderability.) Our construction is non-slanderable un-
der the Strong RSA assumption in the random oracle model 
Summarizing, we have 
Theorem 4 (Security.) Our construction is a secure LRS scheme. 
5.3.2 Proofs 
, Proof 3 (Lemma 1.) (Sketch.) The proof follows the same arguments as 
those in [43]. Simply speaking, if there exists an adversary who is able to pro-
duce a valid signature, then he must know a witness behind the SPK represented 
by Equation (5.2), under the Strong RSA Assumption. Next, the collision-
resistant accumulator with one-way domain forces that particular witness to 
be a secret key whose corresponding public key is in the public key set, due to 
again the Strong RSA Assumption. In order words, a simulator can be con-
structed in a way such that if there exists an algorithm that is able to produce 
a valid signature, the simulator can use it to compute the secret key behind a 
public key, i.e. solve the strong RSA problem, which contradicts to the strong 
RSA Assumption. • 
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Proof 4 (Lemma 2.) (Sketch.) Our proposed construction has linkable anonymity 
because of the following two reasons. First, the SPK represented by Equation 
(5.2) is a signature scheme derived from an HVZK protocol. Transcripts of 
HKZK protocols are has zero-knowledge about the witness and thus contain no 
information about the identity of the actual signer. Second, the auxiliary infor-
mation Ti,..., Ts and y are computationally indistinguishable from randomly 
generated elements if the DDH Assumption and the LD-RSA Assumption hold 
in QR{N). From the above two points, if there exists an algorithm that is en-
able to distinguish the identity of the actual signer better than random guess, 
a simulator can be constructed to solve either the DDH Problem in QR{N) or 
the LD-RSA Problem in QR[N), contradicting to the Assumptions. • 
Proof 5 (Lemma 3.) (Sketch.) The proof is somewhat similar to that for un-
forgeability. Given the Strong RSA Assumption holds, an adversary is forced 
to compute a signature honestly for the SPK represented by Equation (5.2). 
As a result, two valid signatures signed using the same secret key are forced to 
contain the same linkability tag y. In other words, if there exists an algorithm 
that is enable to compute two valid but unlinked signature given only one secret 
key, a simulator can be constructed to solve the Strong RSA Problem. • 
Proof 6 (Lemma 4.) (Sketch.)// an adversary is able to produce a valid sig-
nature that is linked to another signature signed by some honest user, he must 
know the discrete logarithm (ei + 62) of the linkability tag y. Again, it is due 
to the soundness of the SPK represented by Equation (5.2), under the strong 
RSA Assumption. Therefore a simulator can be constructed to solve the Strong 
RSA Assumption given access to the adversary. • 
Proof 7 (Theorem 4.) The theorem is a direct consequence of the above lem-
mas. , • 
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5.4 Discussion 
Devising the Linkability Tag 
The most crucial contribution in devising the construction in this chapter is 
a good design of the linkability tag. Let's look at some criteria that we must 
take account into when designing the tag. 
It should be easy to understand that the tag must be some one-way image 
of a user's secret key. Intuitively, a linkability tag is like a garbage-like serial 
number of each user. The one-wayness is to make sure no one can, infer the 
identity of the actual signer from the tag. However, the above is not enough, 
as illustrated by the following. 
• If we change the mapping from y : = 『 计 t o y := then linkability is 
lost because a single user in possession of a secret key (ei, 62) can produce 
two unlinked signatures with yi := g^ ^ and 仏:=g^^. 
• If we replace it with y := then L-anonymity is lost because it is 
easy to identify the actual signer from the tag: g^^ = y'^g. 
However, a (probably) secure alternative choice is �4( (e i , e2 ) ) = ("f,说）. 
Note that 9d^ 2 while 0ci’3 are not special PK-bijective. 
A related security requirement is to that, given a random sample yi, it is 
hard to compute 2/2 such that there exist Xi, X2, satisfying (xi,yi), (0^ 2, 
G 7Z, Od{xi) = This stronger concept may be needed in further study 
of the current topic, but it is not needed in the present paper. 
Short Linkable Group Signature 
It is straightforward to extend our short linkable ring signature construction 
to linkable group signatures [76, 77]. Simply also escrow the user identity (or 
the user public key) to an Open Authority (OA) in the signatures. The escrow 
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can be done by verifiably encrypt the identity (or public key) to the OA by 
methods in [9], for example. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have proposed the first short linkable ring signature scheme 
construction. By short we mean the signature size is independent of the size 
of the member group a signature is signed on behalf of. Being short enables 
linkable ring signatures to be scalable and deployed in large-scale scenarios. We 
have proposed a new mathematical assumption and then reduced the security 
of our construction to it plus several well-known mathematical assumptions. 
Chapter 6 
Separable Linkable Threshold 
Ring Signatures 
In this chapter,.we propose the first separable linkable threshold ring signature 
scheme. Separability is the key for a scheme to be practically deployed in ad 
hoc environment in which machines are highly heterogenous. Our proposed 
scheme also supports thresholding efficiently in the sense of computational and 
storage/communication complexities. We reduce the security of our scheme to 
well-known mathematical assumptions. 
6.1 Introduction 
THRESHOLD CRYPTOGRAPHY. AS have discussed before, threshold cryptog-
raphy aims at extending conventional cryptographic protocols into a multi-user 
setting. In the sense of (linkable) ring signature schemes, it means the follow-
ing: among a group of n members, some t G [1, n] of them^ work jointly to 
sign a signature. Such a signature is verified to be valid if and only if t or more 
members cooperate in the signing process. Thus a verifier is convinced by a 
valid signature that some t or more members out of a group of n users agreed 
to sign. 
iThe special case when t = 1 actually goes back to the conventional non-threshold case. 
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In [68], a (d, ri)-threshold extension to its original linkable ring signature 
scheme is constructed by concatenating d linkable ring signatures. We note 
that the construction, though simple and trivial, is not efficient. In particular, 
the space and time complexities are both 0(dn). We give in this chapter a 
construction with time and space complexities both being 0(n). 
SEPARABILITY. In [23], Camenisch, et. al. diversified the concept of sep-
arability of cryptographic protocols [63] into perfect separability, strong sep-
arability and weak separability when describing users' ability to choose their 
own cryptographic primitive and system parameters. Separability is of partic-
ular importance for ring signature schemes as there is no group manager to 
coordinate the choice of signature primitive and system parameters for each 
user. For instance, a ring signature scheme that is only weakly separable is 
not practical at all as it is unlikely to have all group members using the same 
primitive, system parameters and security parameters. The RSA implementa-
tion of [91, 1, 67, 100, 68] are strongly separable while the DL implementation 
of [1, 67, 68] are only weakly separable. 
Our Contributions in this Chapter 
‘ Our contribution in this chapter includes: 
• We give a construction of the first separable linkable ring signature 
scheme. It also the first linkable ring signature scheme construction of 
the CDS-type ([37]). ‘ 
• Our construction supports bandwidth-efficient threshold signing. The 
signature size in [68] is 0{dn) while ours is 0(n), where n is the number 
of users and d is the threshold. 
• We prove the security of our construction based on well-known hard 
problem assumptions. 
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6.2 The Construction 
In this section, we give a concrete construction of a linkable threshold ring 
signature (LTRS) scheme. We then show that such a construction is secure 
under the security model defined earlier. 
• I nit. On input the security parameter G N, the algorithm picks 
« G N of size polynomial in A and 1 < e G IR. It also picks a k,-
bit prime q uniformly at random and then a strong collision-resistant 
hash function H : {0，1}* — Z ^ . It outputs the system parameters 
param = (1 入’ e, q � H ) . 
• Key-Gen. On input the system's parameters param and a further secu-
rity parameter ！‘^  such that Ai 2 A，the algorithm randomly picks two 
distinct primes Qi of the form Pi = 2p'-+ 1 and Qi = 2q'- + 1, where 
p-, q\ are both ((A^ — 2)/2)-bit primes, and sets Ni := p冲.It then picks 
uniformly at random an element gi G/? = QR{Ni)} and an integer 
Xi ^R Zp'.q'. and computes yi It picks a strong collision-resistant 
hash function Hi : {0,1}* — {h\{h) = QR{Ni)}. It sets the public key to 
- pki := Ni, gi,yi, Hi), and the secret key to ski '•= {pi,qi,Xi). Finally 
it outputs (ski^pki). 
• Sign. On input the system's parameters param = ( l\ e, K, i f ) , an 
event-id e G {0,1}*, a group size n G N of size polynomial in A, a 
threshold d G [1, n], a public key set y = {pki , . . . where each 
pki = Ni, gi,yi. Hi) is s.t. Af 2 入，a message M G {0,1}*, and a 
private key set X = {s/Ctti, . . . , s/Ctt^ } where each s/c^ rj = (Ptt^ , qiTi^^TT^) 
corresponds to pky^. G the algorithm does the following: (Define 
1 = {tti, . . . ,7rd} C [l,n].) 
1. For all i G [1, n], compute the tag bases hi’e ：= i/i(param,pA;j, e) and 
the tags 
Chapter 6 Separable Linkable Threshold Ring Signatures 75 
~ / / c , ⑷； 
[K:e, i e [1,几]fli Er ZLiV./4J-
2. Compute a signature ( / , S i , . . . , s^) for 
SPK I (a i , . . . ’ a j : V = N he = “二) 1 (M). 
{ Jepd([i，n]) \iej ) J 
In particular, this requires the knowledge of Xt^  , . . . , x r^^ . We will 
refer to this signature scheme as SPKi. 
3. Compute a signature (c, s'” ...，sJJ for 
' SPK< (A,...’AO: A级’e 二 " 
In particular, this requires the knowledge of Xi for all i e T and a^  
for all i G [1, n]\I. We will refer to this signature scheme as SPK2. 
4. Output the signature as 
^ :=�((仏’e，…’ yn,e)i (/ ’ "^ l, • . • , (C, S” • . .，S )^). 
Remark: The signature is composed of three parts: (1) a set of tags, 
(2) a signature for SPKi, and (3) a signature for S P K � . 
• Verify. On input the system's parameters param = (1^, e, q, H), an 
event id e G {0,1}*, a group size n of size polynomial in A, a thresh-
old d e [1, n], a public key set = {pki,... where each pki = 
Xi, Ni, Qi, yi, Hi) with 入么 2 A, a message M G {0,1}*, and a signature a G 
S, the algorithm parses a into�((仏’... ’ &)，(/, S i , . . . , s„)，(c, s'” . . . , s “ ) � . 
1. For i e [l,n], compute := //i(param,p/c“ e). 
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2. Verify if ( / , S i , . . . , Sn) is a correct signature for SPKi. 
3. Verify if (c, s;,…，s^) is a correct signature for SPK). 
4. Output 1 if the above verifications are okay. Output 0 otherwise. 
• Link. On input two augmented signatures aiLx and oiSr such that 
Verify((7aux) = 1 for i = 1,2, the algorithm parses, for z = 1,2, Oalx 
into 
(param⑷’ e⑷,n⑷,d⑷,：^⑷,M⑷’ o•⑴)• 
It is required that param�=param(2) and e � =e ( 2 ) . The algorithm 
parses, for i = 1, 2, � into {pk^ i \ ...,pk^jji)} and a � into 
• • • , d()i),e)，(/(力’ )，. . .， U^i)) 5 (C( ), "S/ ), • . . , 丄 i)))�-
If there exists 兀“）G [l,n(i)] and 7r(2) e [l,n(2)] s.t. pkl% = pkl% and 




6.3 Security Analysis 
In this section, we prove the security of our construction. 
6.3.1 Security. Theorems 
We have the following lemmas. 
Lemma 5 (Unforgeability.) Our construction is unforgeable under the Strong 
RSA assumption in the random oracle model. 
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Lemma 6 (Linkable-anonymity.) Our construction is anonymous under 
the Strong RSA assumption and DDH over QR(N) assumption in the ran-
dom oracle model 
Lemma 7 (Linkability.) Our construction is linkable under the Strong RSA 
assumption in the random oracle model. 
Lemma 8 (Non-Slanderability.) Our construction is non-slanderable un-
der the Strong RSA assumption in the random oracle model. 
Finally, we have the following theorem. 
Theorem 5 (Security.) Our construction is a secure LTRS scheme. 
6.3.2 Proofs 
Proof 8 (Lemma 5.) (Sketch.) Roughly speaking, similarly constructed ring 
signatures [67] already has unforgeahility, and that implies unforgeability with 
linkable ring signatures. • 
‘ Proof 9 (Lemma 6.) (Sketch.) Simulating Signing Oracle, SO: Upon input 
- (e, n, d, y, V，X, M)，generate a valid signature as follows: For each i G 
randomly generate ai and compute 仏’e = For each z G V, randomly gen-
erate CLi and backpatch the random oracle to hi^e = Hi{param,pki, e) = g? and 
compute 级，e = y"''. Ensure consistency with other oracles from the beginning. 
Generate Cq, • • •, Cn such that they interpolate a polynomial f with degree 
< n — d and f{i) = Ci for 0 < i < n. For each i, simulate the corresponding 
3-move conversation.in Step (2) of Sign with randomly generated responses Si, 
.••，Sn to produce the commitments. Backpatch the random oracle so that the 
commitments are hashed to Cq. This completes up to Step (2) in Sign. The 
rest is easy: Randomly generate challenge c, simulate the SPK in Step (3) of 
Sign with randomly generate responses s[, ...，s“. 
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Setting up the gauntlet for solving DDH: Similar to proof of anonymity in 
[68]. Let Qj be the number of JO queries. Denote the Gauntlet DDH Prob-
lem as (N，g,『，g^,�)where ^ = a(3 with probability 1/2. In the Gauntlet 
Phase, Simulator S sets up the witness extraction mechanism as follows: Ran-
domly select i* G {1, • • • , Qj}- Return pk* — (/, fl,自,�,H) in the i*-th JO 
query, backpatch Random Oracle HOi* to hi,e = g^. There is a non-negligible 
probability that pk* = yg, the gauntlet public key. Generate the Gauntlet sig-
nature cr'g with 级’e =�and simulate the SPK's. With 1/2 probability, a/3 = 7 
and it can be shown that the gauntlet signature is indistinguishable from one 
generated using Sign. Otherwise, with 1/2 probability, a(5 ^ ^ and it can be 
shown that g'^ is indistinguishable from one generated using SO. 
If A returns b = 1, S answers Yes to the DDH question. Otherwise, S 
answers No. S 's advantage in DDH equals A^s advantage in winning Game 
LA. • 
Proof 10 (Lemma 7.) (Sketch.) Similar to proof of linkability in [68]. If 
Adversary can produce two unlinked signatures, then he is rewound twice to 
produce two sets of witnesses of set-size di and d] respectively. If the two sets 
overlap, then the threshold signatures should have already been linked. If the 
two sets do not overlap, then we would have obtained a total of di+d? witnesses 
while Adversary only corrupted at most di d2 — I witnesses. • 
Proof 11 (Lemma 8.) (Sketch.) The non-slanderability is protected by Step 
(3) of the signature. Given a signature from SO, Adversary does not know the 
discrete logarithm of any yi, and therefore cannot produce a signature contain-
ing some yj and prove knowledge of logarithm of yj as in Sign 's Step (3). • 
Proof 12 (Theorem 5.) The proof is a straightforward implication of the 
above lemmas. , • 
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6.4 Discussion 
Separability 
In our LRS scheme construction, individual users can choose their own security 
parameter A^  (as long as it is no less than the global security parameter A), 
their own A -^bit safe-prime product Ni and also their own group generator Qi 
for QR{Ni). As a result, our construction is separable. 
We used in our construction user key pairs from the Discrete Logarithm 
(DL) over composite moduli, i.e. the secret key Xi and public key yi of user i 
are related by yi = g^' (mod Ni), where Ni is a composite modulus. However 
it is possible and straightforward to modify our construction to allow user key 
pairs from DL over a prime modulus, i.e. the keys are related by yi = 
(mod Pi), Pi being prime. Of course, the security will then reduce to different 
hardness assumptions, namely the DL and DDH Assumptions over finite cyclic 
groups. Putting it one step further, our construction can actually support a 
mixture of composite DL and prime DL key pairs. 
RST-type Ring Signatures 
> Our construction utilizes the CDS-type structure, meaning the structure from 
Cramer, et al. [37]. However it is easy to adapt the technique in our construc-
tion to construct the first separable linkable ring signature of the RST-type, 
meaning the structure from Rivest, et al. [91], if thresholding is not required. 
The idea of how to do it is to simply follow the construction given by [68], 
but use different tags for different users instead using a single tag for all users. 
If we denote by yi the tag for user i, then 仏:=h^^ for some randomly generated 
CLi except ys ：= h ? with signer s. All the signer has to do is to simulate the 
following signature of knowledge 
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along the ring, but with the challenge computed as Hash{commitmentSi):= 
challengci+i, except for the actual signer. 
The linkable ring signature scheme construction resulted is still separable, 
and still supports a mixture of composite DL and prime DL key pairs. 
Thresholding 
The time and storage/communication complexities of our linkable threshold 
ring signatures is 0{n) {n being the group size), and is thus independent of 
the threshold value d. This greatly improves upon the construction given by 
68] in which the time and storage/communication complexities are 0{dn)^. 
In [68], a linkable ring signature scheme construction is first presented and 
its threshold extension is later discussed. There is no security model and proofs 
for the threshold extension. Even though the extension is surprisingly simple 
and plausible, there is no in-depth analysis of the security of such an extension. 
On the contrary, we present our linkable threshold ring signature scheme with 
full security model and proofs. 
However, our scheme is interactive while [68] is non-interactive. More 
- specifically, the signers in our scheme must interact during the signing process. 
- In [68], the signers produce on their own their "partial signatures", which can 
later be combined by anybody to become a linkable threshold ring signature. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have proposed the first separable linkable threshold ring 
signature scheme. Separability is the key for a scheme to be practically de-
ployed in ad hoc environment in which machines are highly heterogenous. Our 
2For example, if one takes d to be n/2, then their complexities are O(n^), inferring 
impracticality for fairly large n. “ 
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proposed scheme also supports thresholding efficiently in the sense of computa-
tional and storage/communication complexities. We have reduced the security 
of our scheme to well-known mathematical assumptions. 
Chapter 7 
Applications 
In this chapter, we discuss real-life examples when Cryptography is applied 
to achieve the stringent and sometimes contradictory requirements of various 
applications. .The three applications we are going to look at are: Offline 
Anonymous Electronic Cash, E- Voting and Anonymous Attestation. 
Our Contributions in this Chapter 
Our contributions in this chapter are as follows. 
• Kiayias et al. presented in [62] the first electronic voting scheme that si-
multaneously achieved efficient tallying, universal verifiability and write-
in capability, for typical voter distribution under which only a small 
portion writes in. We discuss that e-voting scheme constructed from 
linkable ring signatures [68] also achieve the same three properties, even 
for all worst-case voter distributions. 
• We discuss an efficient implementation of anonymous attestation [17] us-
- ing linkable ring signatures, and the construction of an offline anonymous 
electronic cash system using linkable ring/group signatures. 
82 ‘ 
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7.1 Offline Anonymous Electronic Cash 
7.1.1 Introduction 
Offline Anonymous Electronic Cash (e-cash) can be thought of the electronic 
counterpart of conventional paper money and coins. It is the key to the suc-
cess of e-business because it enables business transactions to be done over the 
Internet. Some people even believe that e-cash will eventually replace all pa-
per money and coins. There have been a lot of strong incentives to motivate 
the development of e-cash system - enabling e-business is with no doubt a 
prime example; others include reducing the cost of printing paper money and 
stamping coins, offering better protection against fraud and black-mailing, etc. 
Despite decades of effort, online business is still far away from being pop-
ular. The reasons are complicated. On one hand, devising an efficient and 
yet secure e-cash system has been proven to be a very difficult task. Not 
being 100% secure is simply far too risky and thus unacceptable in business 
and banking industry. On the other hand, end users' and corporation's habit 
of paying, inertia of switching and skeptic attitude towards new technology 
- greatly undermine the possible development of new systems. 
- A major stream of e-cash systems found in the literature makes use of blind 
signatures. In such systems, the users withdraw electronic coins that consist 
of numbers generated by users and then blindly signed by the bank. Each 
blind signature then represents a given amount. When these coins are later 
spent in shops, the merchants can authenticate the coins by using the public 
key of the bank. Anonymity of users is maintained in the transactions as 
nobody, not even the bank, can link the withdrawed coins and the spent coins. 
Existing schemes of this category are fruitful, some of the important ones are: 
3 0 , 3 3’ 15, 24:. 
E-cash systems by group signatures recently received much attention. The 
group members in the group signature scheme forms a group of users. The 
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bank, who plays the role of the Group Manager, is capable of issuing electronic 
coins (which are actually the member certificates, or the ability to sign) to the 
users. When a user spends, what he/she does is to sign a group signature for 
the shop. The anonymity inherited from the group signature scheme provides 
privacy for the users. Examples: [72, 96, 73 . 
7.1.2 Construction 
The short linkable ring signature scheme construction we proposed in Chapter 
5 can be used to construct an e-cash scheme. It serves as a new alternative to 
e-cash schemes of the "group signature approach", as described in the intro-
duction. 
The Bank takes the role of the Group Manager. We adopt the "group of 
coins" model: each user key pair represents a coin; the knowledge of a user 
secret key means the ability to spend a coin; and anonymity is among the 
group of coins issued. The Bank initializes our short linkable group signature 
scheme. Assume the shops and the users have their accounts established with 
the bank. 
. • (Withdrawal.) To withdraw a coin, the user first runs the Key Generation 
algorithm to obtain a key pair. He keeps the secret key with himself and 
gives the public key to the bank. The bank debits the user's account, 
and update the group public key by accumulating the new public key 
into the current group public key. 
• (Payment.) The user signs a linkable ring signature, using his secret key, 
on the payment transcript, on behalf of the most up-to-date coin group 
(i.e. using the most up-to-date group public key). The shop verifies 
against the signature and accepts the payment if the signature is valid. 
• (Deposit.) The shop gives the bank the payment transcript, along with 
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the associated linkable group signature. The bank verifies as the shop 
did and credits the shop's account if the signature is valid. To detect 
double-spending, the bank goes through the deposit database to look for 
signatures that are linked. 
Double spenders of the e-cash are detected as double signers of the linkable 
ring signature scheme. However, methodologies differ after detection. In non-
accusatory linkability, the suspect can only be tagged and prevented from 
further double spending afterwards. The drawbacks are time delay to effective 
tagging and small punishment for the offense. In accusatory linkability, the 
linking algorithm outputs a suspect. If linkable group signature is used instead, 
the linked signatures can be passed on to the revocation manager in order to 
open the identity of the double spender. 
7.2 Electronic Voting 
7.2.1 Introduction 
- Electronic Voting is to vote with the help of computers. Situations can vary 
- from replacing paper-ballots with touch-screen terminals, to enabling a voter 
to cast his vote at home. Electronic Voting tries to make voting easier and 
more accessible, tallying faster and more accurate, the overall cost lower, the 
poll more secure, etc. �� 
From the technology point of view, cryptographically secure ballot elec-
tions can be classified into three basic paradigms. Under the blind signature 
30] paradigm, the voters get their ballots from the voting authority, in a 
certified but privacy-preserved way. This enables them to embed any form 
of ballot, e.g. multiple choice questions, open-ended questions, or both. An 
anonymous channel is required between the voter and the tallying authorities 
in order to hide the identity of the voter when he casts his ballot. In this 
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approach, universal verifiability is missing and robustness is achieved usually 
by thresholding the authority. 
Under the homomorphic encryption [36] paradigm, the casted ballots are 
first encrypted and then "compressed" using a homomorphic encryption scheme 
into a tally. This compression property allows extremely fast tallying, and is 
one of the reasons why this approach is attractive. The drawback is, however, 
homomorphic encryption can only compress ballots without write-in and is 
therefore only suitable when ballots contain only multiple choice questions. 
Under the mix-net [29] paradigm, the tallying officials move the ballots 
between them and permute them in the process while changing their repre-
sentation (e.g., partially decrypting them). Practical implementations of this 
approach in its fully robust form is still considered a slow tallying process. 
Remarkable advances in group/ring signatures in recent years have given 
new options to e-voting scheme constructions. In fact, many papers on group/ring 
signatures have included e-voting as applications. Using group/ring signatures 
contributes to a new paradigm of e-voting construction. 
Nevertheless, none of the existing group/ring signature schemes gives raise 
. to a satisfactory construction. First, most group signature schemes are un-
. linkable, which means double-voting cannot be detected (an exception: the 
one-show credential system due to [19]). Secondly, and more importantly, 
anonymity revocation is an inherited property in group signatures/credential 
systems. Note that anonymity is of prime concern in e-voting. Nothing justifies 
to open a vote. 
Previously proposed linkable ring signature schemes partly solved the prob-
lem because they have (1) double-voting detecting capability and (2) no anonymity 
revocation. However, all existing schemes have signature sizes linear with the 
signing group, which makes them impractical when used in large-scale voting. 
Our short linkable ring signature scheme construction given in Chapter 5 has 
constant signature size and is thus very practical in this sense. 
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7.2.2 Construction 
We use the construction of an e-voting scheme from [68]. The main contribu-
tion of the construction that appears here with respect to the one in [68] is 
that we have an 0(l)-sized signature whereas [68] used an 0(n)-sized signa-
ture, where n is the group size. We summarize the e-voting scheme below. For 
further details, see [68 . 
• (Registration.) Through a registration process, a list of the public keys 
of all eligible voters is published. Each voter can check if. his public key 
is included. A number of independent registrants can be used to ensure 
that no ineligible entity is listed. 
• (Vote Casting.) Each voter sends in a linkable ring signature on a mes-
sage which states its selected candidate, from a prescribed candidate list 
or as a write-in candidate. The cast ballots can be listed in a public 
bulletin board for voter inspection. 
• (Tallying.) Simply verify all received linkable ring signatures, drop the 
„ invalid or linked ones, and tally the remaining according to their signed 
„ messages. 
Kiayias and Yung [62] hybridized homomorphic encryption and mix-net 
to achieves simultaneously (1) efficient tallying, (2) universal verifiability and 
(3) write-in capability under typical voter distribution where only a small 
proportion of voters write-in. Our e-voting scheme above achieves the same 
even under worst-case voter distributions: the proportion of voters who write 
in can vary from negligible to overwhelming. To write-in in our scheme, a 
voter simply sends in a linkable ring signature on the message which includes 
its write-in candidate. 
.1 
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If one worries about the group manager having too much power from know-
ing the factoring of N, then Boneh and Franklin's [12] for generating N col-
laboratively among a number of servers, none of which knows the factoring of 
N, can be used. Nakanishi, et al. [76, 77] presented e-voting from linkable 
group signature. Our version of the linkable group signature can also be used 
to construct e-voting. 
7.2.3 Discussions 
In this section, we would like to talk about electronic voting in a perspective 
beyond the technology aspect. Although advanced technology is the core en-
abler of wide-scale electronic voting, there are issues that have nothing (or 
little) to do with it, but should be taken account into when electronic voting 
is brought in practice. 
The first legally binding online election in the US took place during March 
of 2000. The Democratic presidential primary in Arizona included the possibil-
ity to cast votes using home PCs or sites set up exclusively for this purpose. In 
presidential election of 2004, some states had new electronic voting systems in 
‘ operation. Many security analysts warned that computer voting terminals had 
a significant possibility of voter fraud or data corruption by a software attack. 
Others said that recounts would be nearly impossible with the machines and 
criticized the lack of a "paper trail", which is included in many other trivial 
events such as grocery shopping or using an ATM. 
Making sure that every vote counts is undoubtedly a bedrock of democracy. 
To assure people that their vote is counted as they cast it, the counting of votes 
has to be as transparent as possible. Obviously paperless electronic voting on 
touch-screen terminals offers no confidence to voters that votes are counted as 
they casted. When the software on which votes are counted is protected as 
a corporate trade secret and the software is so complex that if maliciously or 
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unintentionally bad code was embedded no analysis could discover it. Further, 
because there is no voter verified paper record, it is just impossible to do any 
auditing or recount on the electronic votes. Finally the opportunities for fraud 
exist on a greater scale than ever before. 
7.3 Anonymous Attestation 
7.3.1 Introduction 
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) develops and promotes open industry stan-
dard specifications for trusted computing hardware building blocks and soft-
ware interfaces across multiple platforms, e.g. PC's, PDA's, and digital phones. 
This enables more secure data storage, online commerce transactions, etc, 
while protecting privacy and individual rights. In the context of the (TCG), 
Anonymous Attestation is a solution to the following problem: The user of 
such a platform communicates with a verifier who wants to be assured that 
the user indeed uses a platform containing such a trusted hardware module, 
i.e., the verifier wants the trusted platform module (TPM) to authenticate 
itself. However, the user wants her privacy protected and therefore requires 
that the verifier only learns that she uses a TPM but not which particular one. 
The first solution [56] has the drawback of requiring a TTP to be online 
in every transaction. Also, anonymity is lost when the TTP and the verifier 
collude. [17] solves the problem by making use of a group signature scheme 
variant based on the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya group signature scheme [19, 21 . 
Among other differences from the original scheme, the two crucial ones are (1) 
disabling anonymity revocation and (2) including a pseudonym in the signa-
tures. 
In essence, DAA [17] is a group signature without revocability, and with an 
additional feature of rogue tagging. Double signers can be detected, or linked, 
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yet their identities are not revealed. When a double signer is detected, a rogue 
tag is produced to prevent it from signing again: future signatures (attesta-
tions) identified with a known rogue tag is not accepted. Double signers of 
different transactions with the same basename, bsn, are detected. But signing 
twice with different basename is not detected. 
The linkable ring signature is ideally suited to implementing DA A. It is 
a group signature without revocation. Its linkability feature can be used to 
detect double signers, and when linked output the linkability tag, y =编知， 
as the rogue tag. Future signatures whose y equals a known rogue tag is 
not accepted. The value ge can be made a function of the basename but not 
the transaction, e.g. ge = Hash(bsn, • •.). Then double signing on different 
transactions with same basename is linked, while double signing on different 
basename will not be linked. 
7.3.2 Construction 
Below, we highlight a few important points in implementing Anonymous At-
testation from linkable ring signatures. Readers may refer to [17] for further 
details. 
• (Setup for Issuer.) The issuer acts as the Group Manager. He initializes 
our short linkable ring signature scheme. 
• (Join Protocol) The TPM joins by first running Key Generation algo-
rithm of the linkable ring signature scheme in order to obtain a user key 
pair. It then submits the public key to the Issuer and retains the secret 
key. It also proves to the Issuer that the public key is correctly formed. 
• (DAA-Signing Protocol.) The TPM signs a linkable ring signature by 
invoking the Signing algorithm of the linkable ring signature scheme. 
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• (Verification Algorithm.) This is exactly the same as the Verification 
algorithm of the linkable ring signature scheme. 
• (Rogue Tagging.) When a user secret key is found, it should be distrib-
uted to all potential verifiers. These verifiers can then put the key on 
their list of rogue keys. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have discussed real-life examples when Cryptography is 
applied to achieve the stringent and sometimes contradictory requirements of 
various applications. The three applications we are going to look at are: Offline 
Anonymous Electronic Cash, E- Voting and Anonymous Attestation. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have proposed two linkable ring signature schemes for privacy-
preserving applications. They are short linkable ring signature scheme and 
separable linkable threshold ring signature scheme. The short linkable ring 
signature scheme is the first linkable ring signature scheme that produces sig-
natures of size independent of group size. This makes the scheme scalable and 
very practical to be deployed in a large scale. The separable linkable thresh-
old ring signature scheme is the first of its kind to support separability and 
efficient thresholding. Separability allows users of a scheme to be heteroge-
- nous from security parameters to cryptographic primitives and therefore is a 
- favorable property in ad hoc networks, 
t 
We have discussed and rigorously define notions of security and functional-
ity that have never been considered in the literature, such as accusatory link-
ing and non-slanderability. Accusatory linking identifies a cheating signer and 
hence discourages cheating. Accusatorily linkable ring signatures therefore find 
new applications. Non-slanderability ensures honest users cannot be slandered 
on. It is a vital property that should be possessed by all linkable ring signature 
schemes. We have formulated a security model for linkable (threshold) ring 
signature schemes and prove the security of our two proposed constructions 
under the model, under some well-known mathematical assumptions and the 
Link Decisional RSA (LD-RSA) Assumption we formulate. 
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Appendix Conclusion 93 
We have investigated three challenging privacy-preserving applications. They 
are offline anonymous electronic cash, electronic voting and anonymous attes-
tation. They all face a thorny and contradicting difficulty - on one hand users 
want their privacy to be maintained, on the other the authority wants authen-
tication for eligibility. We have shown how to use our proposed schemes to 
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